心海無界，何以隔閡——觀《空海傳》之時代叩問（四）

心海無界，何以隔閡——觀《空海傳》之時代叩問（四）

If the Sea of the Heart Has No Bounds, Why Does Estrangement Remain? — A Question for Our Age from The Legend of Kukai (IV)

李神琦（REX LEE）

人體工程學(xué)研究員｜美國紐約百老匯制作人

畢業(yè)于倫敦政治經(jīng)濟學(xué)院金融與社會學(xué)專業(yè)

曾任紐約蘇富比拍賣公司管理部

觀看中國原創(chuàng)紀(jì)錄片《空海傳》，回望千年前空海渡海求法、架起中日文化橋梁的傳奇歷程，心中生出一個極其深刻、充滿張力，又極易被情緒裹挾的叩問：日本有空海，為什么還那么仇視中國？

Watching the original Chinese documentary The Legend of Kukai and looking back on the legendary journey of a man who crossed the sea a thousand years ago to seek the Dharma and built a cultural bridge between China and Japan, a question rises in the heart — a question that is extraordinarily deep, full of tension, and only too easily hijacked by emotion: If Japan has its Kukai, why does it still harbor such hostility toward China?

這句追問背后，是藏在心底的巨大困惑與深深失望。我們始終懷揣著樸素的文化認(rèn)知：日本文化根源于華夏，空海曾遠赴大唐虔誠求法，感念大唐的文明饋贈，這份千年的文化淵源，理應(yīng)讓日本對中國懷揣心底的敬意，可現(xiàn)實卻是當(dāng)下日本社會對華充斥著復(fù)雜的負(fù)面情緒，這份看似無法調(diào)和的矛盾，恰恰揭示了文化傳承、歷史演進、政治博弈與民族心理之間，錯綜復(fù)雜的斷裂、重構(gòu)與博弈，也讓我們不得不跳出情緒，直面問題的本質(zhì)。

Beneath this question lies a great private confusion and a deep disappointment. We have always carried a plain cultural intuition: Japanese culture is rooted in the civilization of China; Kukai once traveled to Tang China in sincere search of the Dharma and received its civilizational gifts with gratitude. Such a thousand-year-old cultural tie ought, it seems, to preserve an inner respect for China in Japan. And yet the reality is that Japanese society today is saturated with complex negative feelings toward China. This seemingly irreconcilable contradiction points precisely to the tangled fractures, reconstructions, and contests among cultural transmission, historical change, political competition, and national psychology — and it forces us to step out of our emotions and confront the essence of the question.

首先必須澄清一個核心前提：日本仇視中國這一說法，既不準(zhǔn)確，也不公平。 極端的仇視從來不是日本社會的主流，所謂的負(fù)面情緒，更多是基于地緣、輿論、發(fā)展帶來的警惕、競爭、疏離與誤解。絕大多數(shù)普通日本人，對中國并無與生俱來的仇恨，反而因千年文化紐帶，對中國傳統(tǒng)文化抱有天然的親近感。

A core premise must be clarified from the outset: the claim that 'Japan hates China' is neither accurate nor fair. Extreme hatred has never been the mainstream of Japanese society; what people describe as 'negative sentiment' is more accurately wariness, competition, estrangement, and misunderstanding rooted in geography, media, and development dynamics. The great majority of ordinary Japanese bear no innate hatred toward China at all; on the contrary, the thousand-year cultural bond gives them a natural affinity for traditional Chinese culture.

根據(jù)日本內(nèi)閣府2023年發(fā)布的外交輿論調(diào)查數(shù)據(jù)，雖有超八成民眾對中國印象不佳，僅少數(shù)民眾持有好感，但與此同時，近八成日本民眾認(rèn)為中日關(guān)系至關(guān)重要，每年赴中國旅游的日本人依舊數(shù)以百萬計，喜愛中華美食、中國古典文學(xué)、傳統(tǒng)藝術(shù)與唐風(fēng)文化的日本人更是數(shù)量龐大。這一數(shù)據(jù)清晰印證，日本民眾抵觸與反感的，往往是被輿論引導(dǎo)后的中國政治形象、對中國崛起的戰(zhàn)略擔(dān)憂，而非中國本身的文化與歷史，他們依舊鐘愛李白的詩句、《西游記》的故事、京都留存的唐風(fēng)建筑，依舊能從源自中國的文化符號中找到共鳴。由此，真正的問題從不是日本仇視中國，而是為何一個千年以來以中國為師、尊空海為文化圣祖的國家，如今對中國的情感會如此割裂，甚至充斥著誤解與負(fù)面情緒。

According to the 2023 foreign-affairs opinion survey released by Japan's Cabinet Office, although more than 80 percent of the public report an unfavorable impression of China and only a minority express goodwill, at the same time nearly 80 percent of Japanese believe that the China-Japan relationship is critically important; millions of Japanese still travel to China each year; and there remains an enormous number of Japanese who love Chinese cuisine, classical Chinese literature, traditional arts, and Tang-inspired culture. These numbers clearly show that what Japanese people reject is generally the political image of China as shaped by media discourse and the strategic anxiety that comes with China's rise — not the culture or history of China itself. They still love the verses of Li Bai and the story of Journey to the West and the Tang-style architecture preserved in Kyoto; they still find resonance in the cultural symbols that originated in China. The real question, therefore, has never been 'Why does Japan hate China?' but: Why has a country that for a thousand years took China as its teacher and honored Kukai as a cultural patriarch now developed such a fractured, misunderstanding-filled, negative set of feelings toward China?

空海所代表的，是中古時期日本對中國的文化認(rèn)同與文明敬仰，彼時的中國，是毋庸置疑的文明之源、文化導(dǎo)師。公元7至9世紀(jì)，日本開啟全面學(xué)習(xí)大唐的歷程，從政治律令制度、文字體系、佛教文化，到建筑規(guī)制、服飾美學(xué)、音律藝術(shù)，無一不效仿盛唐，空海、最澄等遣唐使，皆是懷揣虔誠之心的求學(xué)者。彼時的日本，清晰地將自己定位為大唐的弟子，以學(xué)習(xí)盛唐文化、傳承盛唐文明為榮，長安是整個東亞的文明中心，是日本自上而下仰望與追隨的精神圣地。

What Kukai represents is the cultural identification and civilizational reverence felt by medieval Japan toward China. At that time, China was beyond dispute the source of civilization and the cultural teacher. From the 7th to the 9th centuries, Japan entered a period of comprehensive learning from Tang China: from political institutions and legal codes to writing systems, Buddhist culture, architectural conventions, dress aesthetics, and the arts of music — everything drew on the model of high-Tang China. Envoys such as Kukai and Saichō went as devout students. Japan at that time clearly positioned itself as a disciple of Tang China and took pride in learning and transmitting Tang culture. Chang'an was the civilizational center of all of East Asia — a spiritual holy place to which Japan, from top to bottom, looked up and followed.

但步入近代，歷經(jīng)明治維新的徹底變革，日本完成了國家身份與自我認(rèn)知的顛覆性重構(gòu)，中日兩國的文明地位與相互認(rèn)知發(fā)生了一百八十度的反轉(zhuǎn)。空海時代，中國是日本敬畏的文明母體、導(dǎo)師般的存在，日本以學(xué)習(xí)者、追隨者的姿態(tài)，全心汲取華夏文明養(yǎng)分；而步入現(xiàn)代，日本將自己定位為亞洲率先實現(xiàn)現(xiàn)代化的強國，是亞洲的文明輸出者，中國則從文明導(dǎo)師淪為地緣政治上的競爭對手、潛在威脅對象。日本早已構(gòu)建起和魂漢才的獨立文化自信，認(rèn)為自身已完成對華夏文化的本土化升華，不再需要向中國俯首、追尋文化根源，徹底完成了從學(xué)生到自詡老師的身份轉(zhuǎn)變，這是兩國關(guān)系發(fā)生質(zhì)變的核心根源。

Entering the modern era, however, Japan underwent a radical transformation through the Meiji Restoration that reconstructed its national identity and self-understanding in an upending way, and the civilizational status and mutual perceptions of the two countries pivoted 180 degrees. In Kukai's time, China was the revered civilizational matrix and mentor, and Japan, as student and follower, absorbed the nourishment of Chinese civilization with its whole heart. In modern times, Japan positioned itself as the first power in Asia to achieve modernization and as Asia's exporter of civilization, while China slipped from 'civilizational teacher' into 'geopolitical rival' and 'potential threat.' Japan had long since constructed the independent cultural confidence of 'Japanese soul, Chinese learning' (wakon kansai), believing itself to have already completed the domestic elevation of Chinese culture and no longer in need of bowing to China to seek its cultural roots. It had made the complete transition from 'student' to 'self-proclaimed teacher.' This is the core root cause of the qualitative change in the relationship between the two countries.

為何空海留下的文化紐帶，沒能讓日本始終對中國保持親近？這份文化與現(xiàn)實的割裂，背后藏著四個層層遞進的深層原因。

Why could the cultural bond left by Kukai not keep Japan in a posture of continued closeness toward China? Behind this split between culture and reality lie four progressively deeper reasons.

其一，文化吸收從來不等同于政治認(rèn)同。空海當(dāng)年遠赴大唐，所學(xué)所傳的是佛教經(jīng)典、文字藝術(shù)、建筑工藝等文化內(nèi)核與技藝，而非中國的政治體制與政治主張；日本千年以來吸收的，是華夏文明中的文化元素與美學(xué)體系，而非對中國的政治臣服與歸屬。日本始終在對華夏文化進行本土化改造，將漢字演化成平假名、片假名，將唐代佛教與本土神道融合形成神佛習(xí)合信仰，將唐風(fēng)美學(xué)打磨成獨具特色的和風(fēng)美學(xué)，他們吸納的是華夏文化之器、之形，卻從未認(rèn)同華夏文明之道、之魂。日本人可以熱愛盛唐的美學(xué)、中國的古典文化，但這并不影響他們對當(dāng)代中國政治立場的不認(rèn)同，就像人們可以鐘愛一個人的文學(xué)作品，卻未必認(rèn)可其所屬的政治立場，文化喜好與政治態(tài)度本就是兩個獨立的維度。

First, cultural absorption has never been the same as political identification. What Kukai studied and transmitted on his journey to Tang China was the cultural core and craft — Buddhist scripture, written and artistic traditions, architectural techniques — not China's political system or political positions. What Japan absorbed over a thousand years were the cultural elements and aesthetic system of Chinese civilization, not political submission or belonging to China. Japan has always localized what it took from Chinese culture: evolving Chinese characters into hiragana and katakana, fusing Tang Buddhism with native Shinto into the integrated belief of shinbutsu-shūgō, refining Tang aesthetics into its own distinctive 'wafū.' What they absorbed were the 'vessels' and 'forms' of Chinese culture, but never its underlying 'Way' and 'soul.' Japanese people can love the aesthetics of high-Tang China and Chinese classical culture without endorsing the political stance of contemporary China — just as one can love an author's literary work without endorsing his politics. Cultural affinity and political attitude are inherently two separate dimensions.

其二，近代屈辱歷史，徹底扭轉(zhuǎn)了日本的對華心理。1894年甲午戰(zhàn)爭，日本擊敗晚清王朝，吞并臺灣；1905年日俄戰(zhàn)爭，日本戰(zhàn)勝俄國，登頂亞洲霸主；1931至1945年，日本悍然發(fā)動侵華戰(zhàn)爭，犯下南京大屠殺等滔天罪行，直至1945年戰(zhàn)敗被美國占領(lǐng)。這段近代歷史，成為日本民族心理的創(chuàng)傷性轉(zhuǎn)折點。從日本的片面視角來看，他們擊敗了彼時腐朽落后的中國，自認(rèn)證明了日本制度與文明的先進性，將侵略行徑合理化，認(rèn)為中國的遭遇源于自身弱?。幻鎸χ袊缃竦目焖籴绕?，日本無法接受曾經(jīng)被自己超越的國家重新迎頭趕上，心底殘存著殖民者的傲慢與強者的不甘心。這種情緒，并非單純的仇視，而是輸不起的傲慢與對失去優(yōu)勢的恐慌，是近代侵略歷史遺留下來的扭曲民族心態(tài)。

Second, the history of modern humiliation entirely inverted Japan's psychology toward China. In 1894, Japan defeated the late Qing in the First Sino-Japanese War and annexed Taiwan. In 1905, Japan defeated Russia in the Russo-Japanese War and ascended to the status of Asian hegemon. From 1931 to 1945, Japan brazenly launched the war of aggression against China and committed enormous crimes such as the Nanjing Massacre, until its defeat and occupation by the United States in 1945. This modern history became a traumatic turning point in Japan's national psychology. From its own one-sided vantage point, Japan believed that by defeating a decayed and backward China it had proven the superiority of its own institutions and civilization, rationalizing its aggression and concluding that China's misfortunes stemmed from its own weakness. Faced today with China's rapid rise, Japan cannot accept that a country it once surpassed has caught up again; a residue of colonial-era arrogance and the unwillingness of the former 'strong party' to concede lingers. This is not pure hatred; it is a mixture of bad-loser pride and panic at the loss of advantage — a distorted national mentality left over from the history of modern aggression.

其三，政治操弄與媒體輿論，系統(tǒng)性塑造了對華負(fù)面認(rèn)知。長期以來，日本主流媒體持續(xù)渲染中國威脅論，將中國的發(fā)展塑造成地緣威脅；日本政府推行價值觀外交，刻意將中國標(biāo)簽化為威權(quán)、不透明的形象；本國教科書刻意淡化、美化侵華歷史，轉(zhuǎn)而強調(diào)自身是戰(zhàn)爭受害者，扭曲年輕一代的歷史認(rèn)知；網(wǎng)絡(luò)空間不斷放大、傳播關(guān)于中國的負(fù)面刻板印象，反復(fù)灌輸偏見。日本民眾從小被這類輿論包圍，接收的都是關(guān)于中國的負(fù)面信息，在長期的系統(tǒng)性污名化引導(dǎo)下，自然難以對中國形成客觀、正面的認(rèn)知，這種民間負(fù)面情緒，本質(zhì)上是政治與輿論引導(dǎo)的結(jié)果，而非自發(fā)形成的仇恨。

Third, political manipulation and media discourse have systematically shaped negative perceptions of China. Over a long period, Japan's mainstream media have continually amplified the 'China threat' narrative, casting China's development as a geopolitical menace. The Japanese government has pursued a 'values diplomacy' that deliberately labels China as authoritarian and opaque. Domestic textbooks have systematically downplayed and whitewashed the history of aggression against China, emphasizing instead Japan's own status as a war victim, distorting the younger generation's grasp of history. Online spaces constantly amplify and circulate negative stereotypes of China, repeatedly instilling prejudice. Japanese people grow up surrounded by such discourse, receiving only negative information about China. Under sustained and systematic stigmatization, it is only natural that forming an objective, positive impression of China should be difficult. The popular negative sentiment is, in essence, a product of political and media steering — not a spontaneously arising hatred.

其四，日本的文化自尊，需要通過切割與中國的關(guān)聯(lián)來確立。在日本的深層民族心理結(jié)構(gòu)中，想要確立自身的民族與文化獨立性，就必須明確區(qū)分自我與文化源頭，而作為其文化母體的中國，自然而然成為了這個參照物。為了證明自身文明的獨特性與優(yōu)越性，日本刻意用和風(fēng)對抗唐風(fēng)，用侘寂美學(xué)對標(biāo)盛唐富麗，用克制內(nèi)斂區(qū)分中原張揚豁達，用社會秩序塑造自我標(biāo)簽。就像渴望證明獨立的孩童，會刻意疏遠、否定父母的喜好，日本為了確立我是誰的民族認(rèn)同，刻意切割與中國的文化淵源，試圖通過超越、否定曾經(jīng)的老師，來樹立自身的文化自尊，這是民族心理發(fā)展過程中，難以避免的自我建構(gòu)邏輯。

Fourth, Japan's cultural self-respect requires establishing itself by severing its association with China. Deep in Japan's national psychological structure, to establish ethnic and cultural independence requires a clear distinction between the self and the cultural source — and China, as the cultural matrix, naturally becomes the reference point. To prove the uniqueness and superiority of its own civilization, Japan deliberately counters Tang style with wafū, measures the splendor of high-Tang against the aesthetics of wabi-sabi, distinguishes its restrained reticence from Central Plain expansiveness, and uses social order to craft its own label. Like a child eager to prove independence who deliberately distances himself from and negates his parents' preferences, Japan — in order to answer the question 'Who am I?' — deliberately severs its cultural lineage with China, seeking to establish its own cultural self-esteem by surpassing and negating its former teacher. This is an almost unavoidable logic of self-construction in the development of a national psyche.

即便當(dāng)下政治輿論層面隔閡深重、對立明顯，空海所代表的中日文化紐帶，也從未真正消失，只是被政治紛爭掩蓋，藏在了大眾視線之外。如今日本的中小學(xué)教材中，依舊收錄《論語》《詩經(jīng)》等中華經(jīng)典，華夏文化基因早已融入其教育體系；京都、奈良的古寺廟宇，依舊懸掛著漢字匾額，盛唐建筑風(fēng)貌完整留存；每年數(shù)以萬計的日本人奔赴西安、洛陽，追尋空海當(dāng)年的求法足跡，銘記這份文化淵源；日本古典文學(xué)巔峰之作《源氏物語》《枕草子》，皆深受唐詩文化滋養(yǎng)，日本學(xué)界至今仍在深耕敦煌文獻、唐代佛經(jīng)研究。這些都足以證明，空海的精神、華夏的文化血脈，從未被日本遺忘，真正的日本民眾，心底深處依舊是空海精神的傳承者，文化的紐帶始終深埋于民族血脈之中。

Even though the political-media climate today is marked by deep estrangement and obvious opposition, the cultural bond represented by Kukai has never truly vanished; it has only been obscured by political disputes and kept out of public view. To this day, Japanese primary- and middle-school texts still include Chinese classics such as the Analects and the Book of Songs; the cultural genes of China have long since been woven into Japan's educational system. Ancient temples in Kyoto and Nara still hang plaques in Chinese characters, with high-Tang architectural forms preserved intact. Tens of thousands of Japanese travel each year to Xi'an and Luoyang to retrace Kukai's footsteps in search of the Dharma, cherishing this cultural lineage. The pinnacles of Japanese classical literature — The Tale of Genji, The Pillow Book — were deeply nourished by Tang poetry, and Japanese scholars still pursue in-depth research on the Dunhuang manuscripts and the Tang-era Buddhist canon. All of this is enough to show that Kukai's spirit and the cultural bloodline of China have never been forgotten by Japan. In their hearts, the true Japanese people are still inheritors of Kukai's spirit; the cultural bond remains buried deep in the national bloodstream.

面對這份歷史與現(xiàn)實的矛盾，我們不該再糾結(jié)于日本為何仇視中國的情緒性追問，而應(yīng)理性反思：為什么我們無法讓日本看見，當(dāng)下的中國早已不是過去的中國，這份千年文化紐帶該如何重新被看見、被珍視。如今的中國，早已擺脫落后挨打的境地，擁有強大的國力與文化自信，但在文化傳播與文明對話中，依舊缺少潤物細(xì)無聲的共情與溝通，生硬的文化輸出、對立的話語表達，難以讓日本民眾感知到中日文化的同根同源，難以理解人類命運共同體的真正內(nèi)涵，反而容易加劇誤解。

Faced with this contradiction between history and reality, we should not continue to be caught up in the emotional question 'Why does Japan hate China?' but should rationally reflect: Why have we been unable to let Japan see that today's China is no longer the China of the past, and how can this thousand-year cultural bond be seen and cherished anew? Today's China has long since emerged from the condition of being poor and bullied and now possesses strong national strength and cultural confidence. Yet in its cultural communication and civilizational dialogue, it still lacks the soft, nourishing-like-fine-rain empathy and communication. Blunt cultural 'output' and adversarial rhetoric make it hard for Japanese people to perceive the shared roots of Chinese and Japanese culture, hard to understand the true meaning of 'a community of shared future for humankind,' and easily deepen misunderstanding instead.

回望空海的一生，他當(dāng)年遠赴長安求法，從來不是仰望強權(quán)，而是向更先進的文明本身致敬，他心中沒有狹隘的國界之分，只有對智慧、真理的追尋，對文明傳承的堅守。這正是空海留給當(dāng)下中日兩國最珍貴的啟示：真正的文明交流，從來不靠武力征服，不靠輿論對立，不靠相互貶低，而是靠自身的光芒彼此吸引，靠文化的共鳴相互理解。

Looking back on Kukai's life, when he went to Chang'an to seek the Dharma he was never bowing to power; he was paying tribute to a more advanced civilization itself. In his heart there were no narrow national lines, only the pursuit of wisdom and truth and a steadfast commitment to the transmission of civilization. This is the most precious lesson Kukai leaves the two countries today: true civilizational exchange has never relied on armed conquest, on adversarial media, or on mutual belittlement. It relies on the mutual attraction of each side's own light, and on understanding drawn from cultural resonance.

我們不必沉溺于失望與憤怒，而應(yīng)重新拾起空海的精神，讓這份跨越千年的文明紐帶，成為化解隔閡、消除誤解的橋梁。我們可以在日本舉辦空海文化專題展覽，講述空海求法、傳承文明的故事；與日本院校開展中日古典詩文共讀、文化交流合作；邀請日本青年重走空海求法之路，親身感受盛唐文化遺存；深挖鑒真、空海等文明使者的歷史故事，傳遞跨越國界、只為真理與文明的精神內(nèi)核。

We need not wallow in disappointment and anger. We should pick up Kukai's spirit again and let this thousand-year civilizational bond become a bridge for dissolving estrangement and dissolving misunderstanding. We can hold exhibitions on Kukai in Japan, telling the story of his search for the Dharma and transmission of civilization; we can work with Japanese institutions to read classical Chinese and Japanese texts together and partner in cultural exchange; we can invite Japanese youth to retrace Kukai's path of pilgrimage and feel the surviving legacy of high-Tang culture firsthand; we can dig deeply into the historical stories of civilizational messengers such as Jianzhen (Ganjin) and Kukai, carrying forward the spiritual core that crosses national borders in service of truth and civilization alone.

空海當(dāng)年渡海，不是為了征服他國，而是為了喚醒人心；他創(chuàng)制平假名，不是為了脫離中國文化，而是為了讓文明智慧惠及更多民眾。他從來不屬于某一個國家，而是整個東亞文明的共同瑰寶，他所跨越的大海，從來不是國與國的界限，而是心與心的隔閡。

When Kukai crossed the sea, it was not to conquer another country but to awaken hearts. When he created hiragana, it was not to break away from Chinese culture but to let civilizational wisdom benefit a wider public. He has never belonged to a single country; he is a common treasure of the whole of East Asian civilization. The sea he crossed was never the boundary between one country and another — it was the distance between heart and heart.

千年前，中日兩國曾共同仰望同一片文明星空，共同傳承《大日經(jīng)》的智慧，共同用漢字書寫情感與文明；千年后的今天，倘若兩國能重新拾起這份文化共鳴，銘記這段以文相交、以心相通的歷史，放下政治偏見與輿論誤解，那些無謂的警惕、疏離與對立，終將消融在深厚的文明長河之中。

A thousand years ago, China and Japan once looked up at the same starry civilizational sky together, jointly transmitted the wisdom of the Mahāvairocana Sūtra, and jointly used Chinese characters to write feeling and civilization. A thousand years later, if the two countries can pick up this cultural resonance again, remember this history of meeting through culture and communing through heart, and set aside political prejudices and media misunderstandings, then the needless wariness, estrangement, and opposition will eventually dissolve into the deep, long river of shared civilization.

空海的精神從未遠去，他始終在文明的長河中低語：心即是佛，海即是家。我們無需強求所有人都認(rèn)同彼此，但至少可以讓日本民眾記得，在千年之前，有一位叫空海的行者，跨越萬里波濤，架起了中日文明相通的橋梁，兩個民族曾攜手走過一段文明共生的旅程。

Kukai's spirit has never gone far away. He still whispers from within the long river of civilization: 'Mind itself is Buddha; the sea itself is home.' We need not demand that everyone agree with each other — but we can at least let the Japanese public remember that a thousand years ago there was a traveler called Kukai who crossed ten thousand miles of waves and built a bridge of communication between the civilizations of China and Japan, and that the two peoples once walked hand in hand through a shared civilizational journey.

那段旅程，以文化為舟，以真誠為槳；那片心海，承載著東亞文明的共同記憶，至今依舊等待著我們，以理解為燈，重新點亮。

That journey had culture for a vessel and sincerity for an oar; that sea of the heart still carries the shared memory of East Asian civilization, still waiting for us — with the lamp of understanding — to light it anew.

附：踐行空海精神，搭建中日文化共鳴的行動方向

Appendix: Practicing Kukai's Spirit — Directions for Building Sino-Japanese Cultural Resonance

1. 打造空海與中日文化交流主題內(nèi)容，面向兩國青年傳播千年文明紐帶故事，消解刻板偏見

1. Produce content focused on Kukai and Sino-Japanese cultural exchange, telling the story of the thousand-year civilizational bond for young people in both countries and dissolving entrenched prejudice.

2. 深化中日學(xué)術(shù)文化交流，整理出版空海相關(guān)文獻典籍，推動兩國高校、研究機構(gòu)雙向?qū)υ?/p>

2. Deepen Sino-Japanese academic and cultural exchange, organizing and publishing Kukai-related texts and advancing two-way dialogue between universities and research institutions on both sides.

3. 組織中日青年重走遣唐使、空海求法之路，以實地體驗替代輿論誤解，建立民間真誠連接

3. Organize Chinese and Japanese youth to retrace the routes of the Tang-bound envoys and Kukai's pilgrimage, replacing media-driven misunderstanding with first-hand experience and building sincere person-to-person connection.

4. 開展唐風(fēng)文化、古典詩詞、傳統(tǒng)美學(xué)等民間交流活動，以文化之美軟化政治對立

4. Undertake grassroots exchanges centered on Tang-style culture, classical poetry, and traditional aesthetics, softening political antagonism through the beauty of culture.

5. 摒棄對立化話語表達，以理性、包容的心態(tài)看待日本民眾的復(fù)雜情緒，以理解換理解，以真誠換真誠

5. Abandon adversarial modes of speech; regard the complex feelings of the Japanese public with a rational, inclusive attitude; exchange understanding for understanding, and sincerity for sincerity.

作者簡介（About the Author）：

李神琦（Rex Lee）是一位華裔美國演員、獲獎劇作家與百老匯制作人，常駐紐約市。他本科畢業(yè)于芝加哥大學(xué)，主修歷史與政治學(xué)，并于倫敦政治經(jīng)濟學(xué)院（LSE）獲得金融與社會學(xué)碩士學(xué)位。
Rex Lee is a Chinese-American actor, award-winning playwright, and Broadway producer based in New York City. He holds a Bachelor’s degree in History and Political Science from the University of Chicago and a Master’s degree in Finance and Sociology from the London School of Economics (LSE).

李神琦擁有橫跨藝術(shù)、金融與公共事務(wù)領(lǐng)域的廣泛經(jīng)驗，曾于國際頂級藝術(shù)拍賣行蘇富比（Sotheby’s）任職，并在華盛頓特區(qū)擔(dān)任企業(yè)說客，代表多家跨國公司進行政策游說。

Lee possesses extensive experience spanning the arts, finance, and public affairs. He previously worked at Sotheby’s, the world-renowned art auction house, and served as a corporate lobbyist in Washington, D.C., representing several multinational corporations in policy advocacy.

他的表演生涯始于入圍全美極具聲望的 Jerry Herman Awards，這一經(jīng)歷點燃了他對舞臺藝術(shù)的熱情。其后，李神琦成為當(dāng)年唯一入選的華裔男演員，受邀加入英國國家劇院（National Theatre Company of Great Britain），并展開國際巡演。他也曾參演美國國家級廣告、影展短片，以及倫敦 Off-West End 的專業(yè)劇場演出，并受保加利亞文化部邀請，赴索菲亞國家劇院登臺演出，展現(xiàn)其多語文化的舞臺魅力。

His performing career began as a finalist for the prestigious Jerry Herman Awards. Subsequently, he became the only Chinese actor selected that year to join the National Theatre Company of Great Britain for an international tour. His credits include national commercials in the U.S., film festival shorts, and professional Off-West End productions. He was also invited by the Bulgarian Ministry of Culture to perform at the National Theatre in Sofia.

舞臺之外，李神琦在學(xué)術(shù)領(lǐng)域同樣表現(xiàn)出色。他曾在全美歷史競賽（National History Bowl）及美國地理奧林匹克（U.S. Geography Olympiad）中取得佳績，并入選美國國家隊。他對全球事務(wù)、文化歷史與地緣政治的深厚理解，持續(xù)為其劇作與表演注入思想深度與跨文化的敘事視角。

Beyond the stage, Lee has excelled in academia, placing in the National History Bowl and the U.S. Geography Olympiad, and earning a spot on the U.S. National Team. His deep understanding of global affairs and cultural history informs the intellectual depth of his playwriting.

作為百老匯制作人，李神琦致力于搭建中美戲劇之間的橋梁——將美國戲劇引入中國，也讓中國作品登上紐約舞臺。他堅信戲劇能夠穿越語言與國界，成為文化交流的窗口與心靈的共鳴。他的作品關(guān)注移民經(jīng)驗、身份認(rèn)同與文化錯位，通過藝術(shù)不斷重塑“歸屬”的意義，推動亞洲敘事在全球劇場中的傳播與再想象。

As a Broadway producer, Lee is dedicated to bridging the theatrical worlds of China and the U.S. His work focuses on the immigrant experience, identity, and cultural displacement, striving to redefine "belonging" and amplify Asian narratives on the global stage.

內(nèi)容說明：文中圖片皆來源于網(wǎng)絡(luò)，內(nèi)容僅做公益性分享，版權(quán)歸原作者所有，如有侵權(quán)請告知刪除！