[外轉(zhuǎn)內(nèi)]美國的立法混亂如何削弱其民主機制

兔主席/tuzhuxi 20250709

（按：此文發(fā)在外網(wǎng)的英文版的中文翻譯（后附英文）。英文表達根據(jù)美國的政治環(huán)境做了調(diào)整。中文反映英文文風。初始原文為作者7月8日《美國的立法鬧劇，以及美國制度的問題》）

2025年7月4日，美國人慶祝獨立日時，特朗普總統(tǒng)簽署了一項他稱為“大而美法案”（One Big Beautiful Bill，簡稱OBBB的法律。這項內(nèi)容龐雜的立法，集中體現(xiàn)了困擾美國治理的許多系統(tǒng)性問題。該法案在國會兩院都以最微弱的優(yōu)勢通過，這清楚地揭示了美國的立法機制如何從一個審議機構，演變成了黨派斗爭和利益集團交易的載體。

OBBB正式編號為H.R.1，它在眾議院僅以四票之差（218票對214票）獲得通過。在參議院，該法案也是勉強過關，依賴副總統(tǒng)JD·萬斯(J.D. Vance)投下打破平局的一票。這份近1,000頁的綜合性法案包羅萬象，從減稅、邊境安全措施，到削減醫(yī)療補助和能源政策——批評者認為，這個立法大雜燴集中體現(xiàn)了當代美國立法的一切問題。

1. 功能失調(diào)的剖析

法案的結構本身就暴露了其眾多制度弊病中的首要問題。OBBB并不代表一個連貫的政策愿景，它更像是立法學者所說的“圣誕樹法案”——一個讓各種利益集團和政治派系掛上他們偏好項目的框架。其結果是產(chǎn)生了一份缺乏哲學一致性的文件，它既包含主要惠及富人的供給側減稅，也包含吸引特朗普工薪階層基本盤的民粹姿態(tài)（如小費免稅）。

這種意識形態(tài)上的不一致反映了一個更深層的問題：缺乏政治學家所稱的“規(guī)劃性治理”（programmatic governance）。與議會制國家中執(zhí)政黨通常提出全面施政綱領不同，美國的立法越來越產(chǎn)生于自下而上的利益聚合過程，而非自上而下的政策設計。OBBB包含的條款范圍廣泛，從增加國防開支到削減醫(yī)療補助，從化石燃料補貼，到一項奇特的、專為阿拉斯加原住民捕鯨船長提供的5萬美元稅收減免——后者純粹是為了爭取阿拉斯加州參議員的支持票。

2. 黨派邏輯的勝利

OBBB的通過說明了美國政治如何演變成了學者們所說的“負面黨派性”（negative partisanship）——一個反對對方比推進自身議程更加重要的體系。該法案幾乎沒有獲得任何民主黨人的支持，并非因為民主黨人必然反對其所有條款，而是因為在他們的黨內(nèi)，支持任何共和黨的倡議在政治上已變得有害。反過來，對某些具體條款可能有保留意見的共和黨人，也感到不得不支持整個法案包，以避免特朗普的怒火并維護黨內(nèi)團結。

這種動態(tài)已將國會從一個政策醞釀與協(xié)商機構，轉(zhuǎn)變成了類似議會制的模式，但又缺少使議會制有效運作的問責機制。在威斯敏斯特式的西方民主國家，執(zhí)政黨面臨定期的信任投票，如果失去立法支持就會被趕下臺。相比之下，美國的立法者則不會因為治理不善而面臨這種直接后果，這在政治決策中制造了經(jīng)濟學家所說的“道德風險”問題。

該法案依賴“預算協(xié)調(diào)”程序——在參議院只需簡單多數(shù)（51票）即可通過，而非通常的60票門檻——進一步說明了該系統(tǒng)的功能失調(diào)。雖然預算協(xié)調(diào)最初是為減少赤字設計的，但它已成為規(guī)避參議院審議傳統(tǒng)的工具。這就產(chǎn)生了一個矛盾：50%的門檻太低，無法確保廣泛的合法性；而60%的門檻在激烈兩極分化的時代又太高，以至于無法實現(xiàn)有效治理。

3. 代議制的幻象

也許最令人不安的是OBBB的復雜性如何破壞了民主問責制。這份近1,000頁的立法，不僅普通公民無法理解，許多在極短時間內(nèi)就投票的立法者也難以理解。這體現(xiàn)了政治理論家所稱的“民主赤字”——現(xiàn)代治理的復雜性與公民理解和評估其代表決策能力之間的巨大鴻溝。

該法案的支持者辯稱，這種復雜性在現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟中不可避免，但這忽略了一個關鍵點：復雜性可以是一種刻意策略，用以逃避審查。通過將不同的政策捆綁在一起，立法者可以因受歡迎的條款而邀功，同時為不受歡迎的條款推卸責任。一位代表可能真心支持法案中的基礎設施支出，卻反對其削減醫(yī)療補助，但選民將難以辨別這種細微差別。

這種復雜性也催生了可稱為“制度化買票”（institutionalised vote-buying）的行為。OBBB包含了許多服務狹隘、特定群體的條款——從特定農(nóng)作物的農(nóng)業(yè)補貼到特定行業(yè)的稅收減免。雖然這類針對性的好處常被辯稱為必要的妥協(xié)，但它們代表了一種合法的腐敗形式，將組織化利益置于更廣泛的公共利益之上。

共和黨眾議員托馬斯·馬西（Thomas Massie）的案例說明了這種動態(tài)。他最初反對該法案，但在特朗普承諾停止公開攻擊他之后，最終同意不再阻撓法案通過——這筆交易與法案本身的優(yōu)劣毫無關系。這種個人交易將治理從政策審議過程，轉(zhuǎn)變成了個人政治生存的交易市場。

4. 問責真空

OBBB的結構制造了學者們所稱的“責任分散”（diffusion of responsibility）——一種沒有任何單一行為者需要為該立法后果負責的局面。個別立法者可以聲稱他們只支持某些條款而否認其他條款。特朗普可以因受歡迎的結果而居功，卻把不受歡迎的結果歸咎于國會。國會領袖們可以拿總統(tǒng)施壓作為他們投票的理由。

考慮到法案的財政影響，這種問責真空尤其成問題。國會預算辦公室估計，OBBB將在未來十年增加3.4萬億美元的聯(lián)邦赤字——這個數(shù)字會讓傳統(tǒng)的財政保守派感到震驚。然而，曾自詡為赤字鷹派的共和黨立法者現(xiàn)在卻支持該措施，這表明黨派忠誠早已凌駕于意識形態(tài)一致性之上。

該法案的“日落條款”——即條款將在2029年自動失效——進一步體現(xiàn)了短期思維。這些條款的存在并非出于政策原因，而是為了符合參議院的預算規(guī)則，制造了一種制度，立法者只需考慮即時的政治利益，而無需考慮長期后果。這嚴重背離了有效治理所需的那種代際思考。

5. 對立法醞釀與協(xié)商（deliberation）的侵蝕

傳統(tǒng)的民主理論認為立法辯論具有認知功能——思想碰撞有助于識別最優(yōu)政策。OBBB的通過表明這個假設不再成立。該法案在5月提出，幾周內(nèi)就獲得通過，沒有留下足夠時間進行有意義的分析或辯論。這種倉促的時間表并非偶然，而是策略性的，旨在阻止可能破壞法案的合理討論與協(xié)商。

這種策略反映了政治學家所說的立法領袖的“議程設定”權力。通過控制辯論的時間和框架，領袖們可以操縱結果，無論其提案的內(nèi)在價值如何。OBBB的支持者明確承認了這種策略，特朗普要求共和黨立法者充當“橡皮圖章”，而非獨立的參與者、討論者、審議者。

6. 馬斯克的反抗及其影響

對OBBB矛盾最戲劇性的說明來自埃隆·馬斯克。他曾向特朗普競選捐款3億美元，是共和黨最大的金主，結果卻成了該法案最著名的批評者。馬斯克的反對部分源于財政擔憂——他領導的“政府效率部”（DOGE）本計劃減少2萬億美元的聯(lián)邦開支，最終結果只有（可疑的）1,900億美元。但這些努力被OBBB的赤字支出完全抵消——不只是數(shù)字上的碾壓，而是政治、政策上的碾壓。他的批評提出了深刻的質(zhì)疑：美國治理是否已經(jīng)從根本上功能失調(diào)。

馬斯克宣布組建新的政黨“美國黨”，這不僅出于個人怨氣；它反映了精英階層對美國兩黨壟斷日益增長的幻滅感。然而，他提出的解決方案——在現(xiàn)有體系內(nèi)創(chuàng)建第三黨——表明他未能解決導致OBBB產(chǎn)生的根本性結構問題——美國的體制問題。在相同制度約束下運作的新政黨，基本不可能產(chǎn)生根本不同的結果。

7. 比較治理：來自國外的經(jīng)驗

OBBB混亂的通過過程，與其他地方的治理模式形成鮮明對比，尤其是在東亞。中國處理重大立法的方式成為“全過程民主”，其包含廣泛的調(diào)查研究、征求意見、協(xié)商、試點項目、漸進實施——這一過程優(yōu)先考慮政策有效性，而非政治表演。西方批評者往往會指出這類體系中的“民主赤字”問題，但他們看不到的是，這樣的過程，往往能產(chǎn)生比美國日益失調(diào)的民主更加連貫、更可持續(xù)，同時也更加反映共識、契合公共利益的政策。

這種比較并非要在各地推行這種文化歷史體系，而是要凸顯美國的制度設計如何變得不適應當代治理挑戰(zhàn)，即使在其自身環(huán)境下也是如此。美國開國元勛設計的制衡體系是為政府角色有限、黨派分歧不那么激烈的更簡單時代設計的。當今復雜、互聯(lián)的世界需要比18世紀制度所能提供的更復雜的協(xié)調(diào)機制。

8. 惡性循環(huán)

也許最令美國人擔憂的是，OBBB的通過會延續(xù)其自身所體現(xiàn)的問題。通過證明微弱多數(shù)能夠在一個分裂的國家強行推行重大變革，該立法將在政治控制權易手時招致報復。民主黨人目睹了共和黨人利用預算協(xié)調(diào)程序通過不受歡迎的措施，當他們重新掌權時很可能會以牙還牙，變本加厲的報復。

這制造了博弈論者所稱的“競相墮落”（race to the bottom）——各方對另一方行為的理性反應會讓所有人情況更糟。其結果是由交替的極端進行治理，而非可持續(xù)的共識構建，各黨的勝利最終都是得不償失的，因為它們只會加劇兩極分化和制度衰敗。

9. 美國例外主義的神話

OBBB事件揭示了美國政治實踐與民主理論相去甚遠。該立法的支持者援引民主合法性——畢竟共和黨贏得了選舉，有權執(zhí)政。但這混淆了程序民主（遵循選舉規(guī)則）與實質(zhì)民主（以反映真正民意并促進長期福祉的方式治理）之間的區(qū)別。

美國政治文化不愿進行制度性的自我批評，更是加劇了這些問題。雖然其他西方民主國家也會辯論憲法改革和制度創(chuàng)新，但美國人卻將他們18世紀的框架視為神圣的文本。這種憲法原教旨主義嚴重阻礙了現(xiàn)代挑戰(zhàn)所需的那種適應性治理。

美國人對其他國家態(tài)度的對比是驚人的。美國人樂于診斷國外的制度失敗，卻對國內(nèi)的類似問題視而不見。這種選擇性視角即心理學家所稱的“動機性推理”（motivated reasoning，讓我們繼續(xù)引用學者概念）——傾向于以證實既有信念而非挑戰(zhàn)它們的方式來評估證據(jù)。

10. 展望未來：改革還是衰??？

OBBB的通過引發(fā)了關于美國民主未來的根本性問題。一個為兩百多年前的前工業(yè)社會設計的體系，究竟能不能治理21世紀的超級大國嗎？建立在妥協(xié)基礎上的制度，在一個存在根本性黨派沖突的時代還能運作嗎？當代表優(yōu)先考慮黨派忠誠而非選民福祉時，代議制民主還能生存嗎？

隨著美國面臨日益嚴峻的挑戰(zhàn)——從氣候變化和技術顛覆，到地緣政治競爭和人口結構轉(zhuǎn)型——這些問題變得更加緊迫。OBBB那種在危機間搖擺、由短期政治算計驅(qū)動的臨時解決方案，似乎完全不適合解決如此復雜、長期的問題。

一些觀察家，尤其是政治右翼，認為美國需要更威權的治理（譬如皇權）來打破民主僵局。這種診斷對僵局的認識可能是對的，但處方也是危險的。歷史表明，民主崩潰很少產(chǎn)生有效治理。

11. 結論：功能失調(diào)的代價

“大而美法案”沒有宏大的愿景，只代表了政治權宜之計針對政策連貫性及長期主義的勝利，黨派利益對國家利益的勝利，以及短期思維對長遠規(guī)劃的勝利。它的通過表明，美國備受推崇的制衡體系已退化為一種逃避問責而非確保善治的機制。

該法案的最終影響，部分取決于立法者無法控制的經(jīng)濟和政治發(fā)展。如果它伴隨著強勁的經(jīng)濟增長，其支持者將宣稱自己正確。如果它導致了財政危機或社會動蕩，批評者會說他們早就警告過這種結果。但無論這些偶然情況如何，OBBB被簽署為法律已經(jīng)損害了美國民主，因為它進一步削弱了公眾對制度的信任，并加深了黨派分裂。

悲劇不在于美國民主不完美——所有政治制度都有缺陷。悲劇在于美國人已經(jīng)喪失了制度性自我反思和改革的能力，而這種能力曾使他們的體系具有適應性和韌性。除非這種能力得以恢復，否則像OBBB這樣的事件可能會變得更加常見，每一次都將進一步削弱民主治理的基礎。

開國元勛們設計的美國制度，是為了服務一個由公民代表組成的共和國，這些代表應本著善意審議公共利益。OBBB的通過表明，那個共和國已不復存在，取而代之的是某種保留了民主形式卻拋棄了其實質(zhì)的東西。美國人能否重建他們失去的東西——甚至是否會認識到需要嘗試——仍然是一個懸而未決的問題，其影響遠超美國國界。

（全文結束）

英文版

How America’s Legislative Chaos Undermines Its Democracy

The "Big and Beautiful Bill" exposes systemic flaws in U.S. governance.

Chairman Rabbit/tuzhuxi July 8, 2025

On July 4th, 2025, as Americans celebrated Independence Day, President Donald Trump signed into law what he called the “One Big Beautiful Bill” (OBBB), a sprawling piece of legislation that encapsulates many of the systemic problems plaguing American governance. The bill’s passage—by the narrowest of margins in both chambers of Congress—offers a revealing case study in how America’s legislative machinery has evolved from a deliberative body into a vehicle for partisan warfare and interest-group bargaining.

The OBBB, formally designated as H.R.1, passed the House of Representatives by just four votes (218-214) and squeaked through the Senate only after Vice President J.D. Vance cast the tie-breaking vote. This near-1,000-page omnibus package encompasses everything from tax cuts and border security measures to healthcare reductions and energy policy—a legislative grab bag that critics argue exemplifies everything wrong with contemporary American lawmaking.

1. The Anatomy of Dysfunction

The bill’s very structure reveals the first of many institutional pathologies. Rather than representing a coherent policy vision, the OBBB functions as what legislative scholars might call a “Christmas tree bill”—a framework onto which various interest groups and political factions have hung their preferred ornaments. The result is a document that lacks philosophical coherence, combining supply-side tax cuts that primarily benefit the wealthy with populist gestures like tip tax exemptions that appeal to Trump’s working-class base.

This ideological incoherence reflects a deeper problem: the absence of what political scientists call “programmatic governance.” Unlike parliamentary systems where governing parties typically present comprehensive manifestos, American legislation increasingly emerges from a bottom-up process of interest aggregation rather than top-down policy design. The OBBB contains provisions ranging from defence spending increases to Medicaid cuts, from fossil fuel subsidies to a peculiar $50,000 tax break for Alaskan indigenous whaling captains—the latter included solely to secure the vote of Alaska’s senator.

2. The Triumph of Partisan Logic

The OBBB’s passage illustrates how American politics has evolved into what scholars term “negative partisanship”—a system where opposing the other side matters more than advancing one’s own agenda. The bill garnered virtually no Democratic support, not because Democrats necessarily oppose all its provisions, but because supporting any Republican initiative has become politically toxic within their party. Conversely, Republicans who might have reservations about specific elements felt compelled to support the package to avoid Trump’s wrath and maintain party unity.

This dynamic has transformed Congress from a deliberative body into what resembles a parliamentary system without the accountability mechanisms that make such systems functional. In Westminster-style democracies, governing parties face regular confidence votes and can be removed if they lose legislative support. American legislators, by contrast, face no such immediate consequences for poor governance, creating what economists call a “moral hazard” problem in political decision-making.

The bill’s reliance on budget reconciliation procedures—which require only a simple majority in the Senate rather than the usual 60-vote threshold—further illustrates the system’s dysfunction. While reconciliation was originally designed for deficit reduction, it has become a tool for circumventing the Senate’s deliberative traditions. This creates a paradox: the 50% threshold is too low to ensure broad legitimacy, while the 60% threshold has become too high to enable governance in an era of intense polarisation.

3. The Illusion of Representation

Perhaps most troubling is how the OBBB’s complexity undermines democratic accountability. At nearly 1,000 pages, the legislation is incomprehensible not only to ordinary citizens but to many of the legislators who voted on it in an incredibly short time frame. This represents what political theorists call the “democratic deficit”—the gap between the complexity of modern governance and citizens’ capacity to understand and evaluate their representatives’ decisions.

The bill’s supporters argue that such complexity is inevitable in a modern economy, but this misses a crucial point: complexity can be a deliberate strategy to avoid scrutiny. By bundling disparate policies together, legislators can claim credit for popular provisions while deflecting responsibility for unpopular ones. A representative might genuinely support the bill’s infrastructure spending while opposing its healthcare cuts, but voters will struggle to parse such nuances.

This complexity also enables what might be termed “institutionalised vote-buying.” The OBBB contains numerous provisions that serve narrow constituencies—from agricultural subsidies for specific crops to tax breaks for particular industries. While such targeted benefits are often defended as necessary compromises, they represent a form of legal corruption that prioritises organised interests over broader public welfare.

The case of Representative Thomas Massie illustrates this dynamic. Initially opposed to the bill, Massie ultimately agreed not to block its passage after Trump promised to cease public attacks on him—a transaction that had nothing to do with the legislation’s merits. Such personal deal-making transforms governance from a process of policy deliberation into a marketplace for individual political survival.

4. The Accountability Vacuum

The OBBB’s structure creates what scholars call “diffusion of responsibility”—a situation where no single actor can be held accountable for the legislation’s consequences. Individual legislators can claim they supported only certain provisions while disavowing others. Trump can take credit for popular outcomes while blaming Congress for unpopular ones. Congressional leaders can point to presidential pressure as justification for their votes.

This accountability vacuum is particularly problematic given the bill’s fiscal implications. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the OBBB will add $3.4 trillion to the federal deficit over the next decade—a figure that would have horrified traditional fiscal conservatives. Yet Republican legislators who once positioned themselves as deficit hawks now support the measure, illustrating how partisan loyalty has superseded ideological consistency.

The bill’s “sunset clauses”—provisions that automatically expire in 2029—further exemplify short-term thinking. These clauses exist not for policy reasons but to comply with Senate budget rules, creating a system where legislators need only consider immediate political benefits rather than long-term consequences. This represents a fundamental departure from the kind of inter-generational thinking that effective governance requires.

5. The Erosion of Deliberation

Traditional democratic theory assumes that legislative debate serves an epistemic function—that the clash of ideas helps identify optimal policies. The OBBB’s passage suggests this assumption no longer holds. The bill was introduced in May and passed within weeks, leaving insufficient time for meaningful analysis or debate. This rushed timeline was not accidental but strategic, designed to prevent the kind of scrutiny that might have derailed the legislation.

Such tactics reflect what political scientists call the “agenda-setting” power of legislative leaders. By controlling the timing and framing of debates, leaders can manipulate outcomes regardless of the underlying merits of their proposals. The OBBB’s supporters explicitly acknowledged this strategy, with Trump demanding that Republican legislators act as “rubber stamps” rather than independent deliberators.

6. The Musk Rebellion and Its Implications

The most dramatic illustration of the OBBB’s contradictions came from Elon Musk, who had donated $300 million to Trump’s campaign but emerged as the bill’s most prominent critic. Musk’s opposition stemmed partly from fiscal concerns—his Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) had aimed to reduce federal spending by $2 trillion, only to see those efforts negated by the OBBB’s deficit spending. But his critique went deeper, questioning whether American governance had become fundamentally dysfunctional.

Musk’s announcement that he would form a new political party represents more than personal pique; it reflects growing elite disillusionment with America’s two-party duopoly. Yet his proposed solution—creating a third party within the existing system—suggests a failure to grapple with the structural problems that produced the OBBB in the first place. New parties operating under the same institutional constraints are unlikely to produce fundamentally different outcomes.

7. Comparative Governance: Lessons from Abroad

The OBBB’s chaotic passage stands in stark contrast to governance models elsewhere, particularly in East Asia. China’s approach to major legislation involves extensive consultation, pilot programmes, and gradual implementation—a process that prioritises policy effectiveness over political theatre. While Western critics may point to “democratic deficits” in such systems, they often deliver more coherent and sustainable policies and reflect public consensus and long term interests as compared with America’s increasingly dysfunctional democracy.

This comparison is not meant to propose this cultural-historical system eveywhere, but to highlight how America’s institutional design has become poorly suited to contemporary governance challenges, even under its own circumstances. The Founders’ system of checks and balances was designed for a simpler era when government’s role was limited and partisan divisions less intense. Today’s complex, interconnected world requires more sophisticated coordination mechanisms than 18th-century institutions can provide.

8. The Vicious Cycle

Perhaps most concerning is how the OBBB’s passage perpetuates the very problems it exemplifies. By demonstrating that narrow majorities can impose sweeping changes on a divided nation, the legislation invites retaliation when political control shifts. Democrats, having watched Republicans use reconciliation to pass unpopular measures, will likely respond in kind when they regain power.

This creates what game theorists call a “race to the bottom”—a dynamic where each side’s rational response to the other’s behaviour makes everyone worse off. The result is governance by alternating extremes rather than sustainable consensus-building, with each party’s victories proving pyrrhic as they fuel greater polarisation and institutional decay.

9. The Myth of American Exceptionalism

The OBBB saga reveals how far American political practice has diverged from democratic theory. The legislation’s supporters invoke democratic legitimacy—after all, Republicans won elections and have the right to govern. But this misses the distinction between procedural democracy (following electoral rules) and substantive democracy (governing in ways that reflect genuine popular will and promote long-term welfare).

American political culture’s reluctance to engage in institutional self-criticism compounds these problems. While other democracies regularly debate constitutional reform and institutional innovation, Americans treat their 18th-century framework as sacred text. This constitutional fundamentalism prevents the kind of adaptive governance that modern challenges require.

The contrast with American attitudes toward other countries is striking. Americans readily diagnose institutional failures abroad while remaining blind to similar problems at home. This selective vision reflects what psychologists call “motivated reasoning”—the tendency to evaluate evidence in ways that confirm pre-existing beliefs rather than challenge them.

10. Looking Forward: Reform or Decay?

The OBBB’s passage raises fundamental questions about American democracy’s future. Can a system designed for a pre-industrial society govern a 21st-century superpower? Can institutions built on compromise function in an era of existential partisan conflict? Can representative democracy survive when representatives prioritise party loyalty over constituent welfare?

These questions become more urgent as America faces mounting challenges—from climate change and technological disruption to geopolitical competition and demographic transformation. The OBBB’s approach—lurching from crisis to crisis with ad hoc solutions driven by short-term political calculations—seems poorly suited to address such complex, long-term problems.

Some observers, particularly on the political right, argue that America needs more authoritarian governance to break through democratic gridlock. This diagnosis may be correct about the gridlock, but the prescription is dangerous. History suggests that democratic breakdown rarely produces effective governance; more often, it leads to corruption, incompetence, and eventual collapse. Weimar Germany in the 1930s gave the world Adolf Hitler. Let America not repeat the same tragic mistake, lest grave consequences from democratic collapse emerge once more beneath its foundations.

11. Conclusion: The Price of Dysfunction

The “One Big Beautiful Bill” is neither big in vision nor beautiful in execution. It represents instead the triumph of political expedience over policy coherence and long-termism, of partisan advantage over national interest, of short-term thinking over long-term planning. Its passage demonstrates how America’s vaunted system of checks and balances has devolved into a mechanism for avoiding accountability rather than ensuring good governance.

The bill’s ultimate impact will depend partly on economic and political developments beyond legislators’ control. If it coincides with strong economic growth, its supporters will claim vindication. If it contributes to fiscal crisis or social unrest, its critics will say they warned of such outcomes. But regardless of these contingencies, the OBBB’s passage has already inflicted damage on American democracy by further eroding public trust in institutions and deepening partisan divisions.

The tragedy is not that American democracy is imperfect—all political systems have flaws. The tragedy is that Americans have lost the capacity for institutional self-reflection and reform that once made their system adaptive and resilient. Until that capacity is restored, episodes like the OBBB will likely become more common, each one further weakening the foundations of democratic governance.

The founders designed American institutions for a republic of citizen-legislators who would deliberate in good faith about the common good. The OBBB’s passage suggests that republic no longer exists, replaced by something that retains democracy’s forms while abandoning its substance. Whether Americans can rebuild what they have lost—or will even recognise the need to try—remains an open question with implications far beyond America’s borders.

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