梅里·馬達(dá)沙希：回望2025，一個(gè)在危機(jī)中被治理的世界

IPP評論是國家高端智庫華南理工大學(xué)公共政策研究院（IPP）官方微信平臺。

導(dǎo)語：

回望2025年，國際秩序顯露出多重變化：安全邏輯加速外溢，滲入貿(mào)易、科技、能源與數(shù)據(jù)；關(guān)稅、制裁、出口管制等從“非常手段”變成日常工具，全球化也從“效率優(yōu)先”轉(zhuǎn)向“韌性與可控”。與此同時(shí)，多邊機(jī)制仍在運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)，卻越來越趨向“程序性合作”，共識愈發(fā)難以生成。權(quán)力更分散、規(guī)則更分裂、成本更外顯，各國正以“不穩(wěn)定性長期存在”為前提重排國家議程。

正是在這一背景下，IPP 榮譽(yù)教授、聯(lián)合國教科文組織國際創(chuàng)意和可持續(xù)發(fā)展中心（ICCSD）顧問理事梅里·馬達(dá)沙希提出一種結(jié)構(gòu)性解釋框架：全球治理之所以愈發(fā)困難，并非只是沖突增多，而是支撐治理的幾張“地圖”開始分道揚(yáng)鑣——地緣政治的邊界、氣候風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的地理、技術(shù)能力的版圖，以及制度與責(zé)任的分配，不再沿著同一套邏輯對齊；同一個(gè)問題在不同尺度上呈現(xiàn)出截然不同的優(yōu)先級。

她據(jù)此將2025年界定為一個(gè)“門檻之年”，也是一個(gè)“轉(zhuǎn)軸之年”。在她看來，危機(jī)不再只是偶發(fā)事件，而是在走向常態(tài)化。文章由此追問：進(jìn)入2026年，如何在多張重疊的版圖之間搭建橋梁，在缺乏共同羅盤的時(shí)代重建最低限度的協(xié)調(diào)與方向感，并重新把權(quán)力與責(zé)任連接起來。

梅里·馬達(dá)沙希（Mehri Madarshahi）

華南理工大學(xué)公共政策研究院（IPP）榮譽(yù)教授、聯(lián)合國教科文組織國際創(chuàng)意和可持續(xù)發(fā)展中心（ICCSD）顧問理事

Honorary Professorof The Institute of Public Policy (IPP) ,South China University of Technology (SCUT) ; Member of Advisory Board of UNESCO International Centre for Creative Economy and Sustainable Development（ICCSD）

正文

2025: The Future in a Year of Fractured Maps

2025：當(dāng)世界版圖開始碎裂，未來將走向何方

Introduction：When the World’s Maps No Longer Align

引言：當(dāng)世界版圖開始錯位

2025年雖不算是國際秩序“轟然崩塌”的一年，但自然也談不上迎來復(fù)興。它的意義在于：越來越多的人開始清醒地意識到——長期影響世界運(yùn)行的那些“圖景”，無論是觀念上的、政治上的還是空間意義上的，已不再重合。權(quán)力、合法性、領(lǐng)土、氣候風(fēng)險(xiǎn)與技術(shù)能力，都沿著不同的邏輯各自運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)。曾經(jīng)看似統(tǒng)一、仿佛可以整體把握的全球圖景，如今已經(jīng)走向碎裂，甚至彼此沖突。

The year 2025 marks neither a dramatic collapse nor a triumphant renewal of the international order. Its significance lies elsewhere: in the growing recognition that the conceptual, political, and spatial maps through which the world has been governed no longer coincide. Power, legitimacy, territory, climate risk, and technological capacity now follow diverging logics. What once appeared as a single navigable global landscape has fragmented into overlapping, sometimes contradictory cartographies.

撇開冷戰(zhàn)時(shí)期不談，我從未經(jīng)歷過像2025年這樣令人不安的一年——不只是因?yàn)槎鄨鲋卮鬀_突同時(shí)爆發(fā)，更因?yàn)槿藗冊絹碓角宄乜吹剑河械臎_突在地緣政治層面可能帶來前所未有的影響。

Cold War aside, I have never experienced a year quite as worrying as 2025- not just because several major conflicts are raging but because it is becoming clear that one of them has geopolitical implications of unparalleled importance.

北約各國政府正處在高度戒備狀態(tài)，緊盯任何可能出事的信號——不管是承載全球電子通信流量的海底電纜可能被切斷，還是無人機(jī)在試探其防御體系的薄弱環(huán)節(jié)。與此同時(shí)，黑客也在不斷升級手段，試圖讓政府機(jī)構(gòu)和應(yīng)急系統(tǒng)“停擺”。

Nato governments are on high alert for any signs that the undersea cables carrying electronic traffic may be cut or thedrones are testing the weakness of their defence system. Already hackers develop ways of putting governmental institutions and emergency systems out of operations.

2025年被三場性質(zhì)迥異的戰(zhàn)爭所標(biāo)記：烏克蘭戰(zhàn)事造成約1.4萬人傷亡；加沙戰(zhàn)爭已致約7萬人死亡，其中包括3萬名婦女和兒童；以及蘇丹境內(nèi)兩支軍事派別之間爆發(fā)的極其殘酷的內(nèi)戰(zhàn)。

The year 2025 has been marked by three very different wars. There is Ukraine with 14 thousands casualties, Gaza with 70,000 killed including 30,000 women and children and the ferocious civil war between two military factions in Sudan.

加沙地帶，孩子們坐在帳篷外。圖源：聯(lián)合國兒童基金會

然而，在即將到來的2026年，俄羅斯注意到美國總統(tǒng)其實(shí)對歐洲興趣寥寥，似乎已經(jīng)準(zhǔn)備好、也有意推動自身取得更大程度的主導(dǎo)地位。與此同時(shí)，莫斯科也清楚地意識到：2025年發(fā)生了一件此前多數(shù)西方國家都難以想象的事——美國總統(tǒng)可能正背棄自二戰(zhàn)結(jié)束以來一直延續(xù)至今的戰(zhàn)略體系，而且這位總統(tǒng)現(xiàn)在也反對歐洲目前的發(fā)展方向。這種令人震驚的觀點(diǎn)，在那份聲稱歐洲正面臨“文明被抹除的嚴(yán)峻前景”的新國家安全戰(zhàn)略報(bào)告中變得清晰起來。

In the coming year, 2026, though, Russia nothing apparent lack of the American President interest to Europe, seems ready and willing to push for much greater territorial dominance. It is gratefully aware that 2025 has presented a possibility that an American president might turn his back on the strategic system vis-a-Europe, which has been in force since WW2, but is now also disapproves of the directions Europe is heading in. This shocking view became clear through the new national security strategy report that claims Europe now faces the “stark prospect of civilisational erasure”.

2025年或許不會被記作一次突如其來的整體崩塌，但更可能被視為一個(gè)關(guān)鍵的轉(zhuǎn)折之年。在這一年，戰(zhàn)略競爭加劇、政治走向碎片化、貿(mào)易日益安全化、制度運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)顯露疲態(tài)——多重趨勢交匯疊加，使“危機(jī)”不再只是國際關(guān)系中的偶發(fā)例外，而逐漸演變?yōu)橐环N常態(tài)化的運(yùn)行狀態(tài)。

2025 may come to be remembered not as a single moment of collapse, but as a hinge year, when strategic rivalry, political fragmentation, trade securitisation, and institutional fatigue converged, transforming crisis from an exception into a governing condition of international relations.

這種區(qū)分至關(guān)重要。因?yàn)椋?b>一個(gè)“經(jīng)歷危機(jī)”的世界，與一個(gè)開始在危機(jī)中運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)、甚至以危機(jī)來治理的世界，完全不是一回事。這種碎片化并非階段性的偶發(fā)波動，而是一種結(jié)構(gòu)性變化。20世紀(jì)末遺留下來的制度、規(guī)范與基本假設(shè)仍在延續(xù)，但支撐它們的現(xiàn)實(shí)條件卻在不斷被侵蝕。到了2025年，世界依然在被治理——只是越來越缺乏一個(gè)共同的方向標(biāo)。結(jié)果并不只是混亂，更是一種系統(tǒng)性的錯位：問題與解決方案之間錯位，責(zé)任與能力之間錯位，全球?qū)用娴男坌呐c地方層面的現(xiàn)實(shí)之間錯位。

This distinction matters. Because a world that experiences a crisis is very different from a world that begins to govern through crisis. This fragmentation is not episodic. It is structural. The institutions，norms, and assumptions inherited from the late twentieth century persist, yet the conditions that sustained them have eroded. In 2025, the world is still governed but increasingly without a shared compass. The result is not chaos alone, but misalignment: between problems and solutions, responsibility and capacity, global ambition and local reality.

我想強(qiáng)調(diào)，2025年應(yīng)當(dāng)被理解為一個(gè)“門檻之年”：未來不再只是線性延伸，而是出現(xiàn)了斷裂。要理解這一年的意義，就必須把地緣政治、氣候、城市與制度層面的裂痕放在同一張圖里看——它們不是彼此孤立的危機(jī)事件，而是同一場結(jié)構(gòu)性轉(zhuǎn)型的不同表征；共同指向的是：世界被組織與被治理的方式，正在發(fā)生更深層次的重組。

I am trying to argue that 2025 should be understood as a threshold year: a moment when the future decisively stops resembling an extension of the recent past. To grasp its meaning, one must read the fractures geopolitical, climatic, urban, and institutional not as isolated crises, but as expressions of a deeper reordering of how the world is organised and governed.

A Fractured World Order: Authority Without Direction

分裂中的世界秩序：權(quán)威猶在，方向已失

在地緣政治層面，2025年暴露出全球領(lǐng)導(dǎo)力核心的一種悖論：國際體系依然高度制度化，卻越來越難形成共同的方向感。既有大國仍保有影響力，但同時(shí)深陷內(nèi)部極化、共識衰退；新興大國不斷強(qiáng)化戰(zhàn)略自主，卻往往回避全球治理所伴隨的責(zé)任與成本。其結(jié)果是——權(quán)威仍在，卻缺乏協(xié)調(diào)。

At the geopolitical level, 2025 exposes a paradox at the heart of global leadership. The international system remains densely institutionalised, yet increasingly incapable of producing collective direction. Established powers retain influence but face internal polarisation and declining consensus. Emerging powers assert strategic autonomy but often resist the burdens associated with global stewardship. The result is authority without coordination.

多邊機(jī)構(gòu)在程序?qū)用嫒栽谶\(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)，但其所承載的規(guī)范性約束力與凝聚力正在明顯減弱。共識變得更脆，談判更趨防御，宏大的共同目標(biāo)則一再被擱置。這未必意味著多邊主義已經(jīng)走到盡頭，卻很可能意味著它正在轉(zhuǎn)型——逐漸演變?yōu)橐环N更功利、更碎片化的運(yùn)行方式。治理并未消失，但呈現(xiàn)出明顯的選擇性：在某些領(lǐng)域依然有效，在另一些領(lǐng)域卻格外脆弱。

Multilateral institutions continued function procedurally, but their normative gravitational pull has weakened. Consensus has become thinner, negotiation more defensive, and ambition frequently postponed. While this may not signal the end of multilateralism, but it could lead its transformation into a more transactional, fragmented practice. Governance persists, but it is selective - robust in some domains- fragile in others.

在2025年預(yù)備COP30氣候談判中，富裕的西方國家、石油生產(chǎn)國和最易受氣候變化影響的小國等談判集團(tuán)之間存在錯綜復(fù)雜的矛盾分歧。即便是歐盟內(nèi)部，在制定新目標(biāo)時(shí)也出現(xiàn)了拉鋸戰(zhàn)。圖源：路透社

到了2025年，移民壓力、非正規(guī)城市化、海岸退化與糧食不安全在多個(gè)地區(qū)相互交織——這些地區(qū)早已穿透并打破了傳統(tǒng)的“南北之分”。風(fēng)險(xiǎn)不再局限于某些特定國家，而是開始集中聚集在三角洲、沿海地帶、特大城市，以及長期被忽視的邊緣地區(qū)。

In 2025, migration pressures, informal urbanisation, coastal degradation, and food insecurity intersect across regions that cut through conventional distinctions between North and South. Risk is no longer confined to specific countries; it clusters around deltas, coastlines, megacities, and neglected peripheries.

這些帶有結(jié)構(gòu)性力量的轉(zhuǎn)型，正在以制度化、強(qiáng)約束的方式重塑安全、金融和戰(zhàn)略同盟；與之形成對照的是，氣候適應(yīng)、城市不平等與環(huán)境韌性等議題，往往被放入自愿性、軟約束的治理框架之中，因此更顯脆弱。這種不對稱，正在塑造一種新的責(zé)任地理：風(fēng)險(xiǎn)被全球化，而應(yīng)對卻被地方化。

These transformative processes affect security, finance, and strategic alliances with different structures, while , by contrast, climate adaptation, urban inequality, and environmental resilience, that are often relegated with voluntary frameworks will be vulnerable. This asymmetry produces a new geography of responsibility: risks are globalised, while responses are localised.

A world re-arming, re-aligning, and hedging

重新武裝、重新結(jié)盟、并不斷對沖風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的世界

回望2025年的世界，有一種趨勢已不容忽視：主要大國一方面不斷強(qiáng)調(diào)穩(wěn)定的重要性，另一方面卻在為長期對抗做著系統(tǒng)性的準(zhǔn)備。

Look around the world in 2025, and one pattern is impossible to ignore: major powers are preparing for long-term confrontation, even while insisting they want stability.

全球年度軍費(fèi)開支已突破2.4萬億美元，達(dá)到二戰(zhàn)以來的最高水平。國防預(yù)算的上升并非集中于某一地區(qū)，而是幾乎在全球同步發(fā)生——美國、歐洲、東亞以及中東均不例外。美國正在推進(jìn)核“三位一體”的現(xiàn)代化，并擴(kuò)張其國防工業(yè)基礎(chǔ)。中國則持續(xù)推進(jìn)的軍事與海軍擴(kuò)張，目前已按艦艇數(shù)量計(jì)算，擁有世界上規(guī)模最大的海軍。

Global military spending has now surpassed $2.4 trillion annually, the highest level since World War II. Defence budgets are rising not just in one region, but everywhere — in the United States, Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East. The US is modernising its nuclear triad and expanding its defence-industrial base. China continues its rapid military and naval expansion, now possessing the world’s largest navy by ship count.

俄羅斯已經(jīng)全面轉(zhuǎn)入戰(zhàn)時(shí)經(jīng)濟(jì)模式。在長期投入不足之后，歐洲國家正加快重新武裝，北約內(nèi)部的國防開支也在實(shí)際意義上出現(xiàn)了兩位數(shù)增長。與此同時(shí)，同盟關(guān)系一方面在收緊，另一方面也在進(jìn)行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)對沖。各國在公開場合繼續(xù)作出承諾，卻在私下里分散合作對象、供應(yīng)鏈和安全保障來源。信任并未消失，但已經(jīng)不再是毫無保留的信任。

Russia has fully shifted to a war economy. European states, after decades of underinvestment, are rearming at speed, with defence spending across NATO rising by double digits in real terms. At the same time, alliances are tightening, but they are also hedging. States are committing publicly while quietly diversifying partners, supply chains, and security guarantees. Trust exists, but it is no longer blind.

當(dāng)?shù)貢r(shí)間2025年12月11日，北約秘書長馬克·呂特出席在柏林舉行的慕尼黑安全會議并發(fā)表演講。他警告稱，北約的歐洲成員國可能成為“俄羅斯的下一個(gè)目標(biāo)”，呼吁迅速增加國防開支。

冷戰(zhàn)時(shí)期，威懾固然令人心生恐懼，但它是高度結(jié)構(gòu)化的：有清晰的紅線，有熱線機(jī)制，有成型的戰(zhàn)略理論，也有對災(zāi)難性后果的共同認(rèn)知。而到了2025年，威懾卻顯得更加單薄、脆弱。升級風(fēng)險(xiǎn)之所以更高，并不是因?yàn)轭I(lǐng)導(dǎo)人更加魯莽，而是因?yàn)?b>牽涉的領(lǐng)域更多、參與的行為體更多，所依賴的技術(shù)也更加復(fù)雜。一次網(wǎng)絡(luò)攻擊、一場衛(wèi)星系統(tǒng)干擾，或一輪供應(yīng)鏈沖擊，都可能在無需發(fā)射一枚導(dǎo)彈的情況下，產(chǎn)生具有戰(zhàn)略層面的后果。

During the Cold War, deterrence was terrifying, but it was also structured. There were red lines, hotlines, doctrines, and shared understandings of catastrophe.In 2025, deterrence feels thinner. Escalation risks are higher, not because leaders are reckless, but because more domains, more actors, and more technologies are involved. A cyberattack, a satellite disruption, or a supply-chain shock can now have strategic consequences, without ever firing a missile.

危機(jī)管理機(jī)制依然存在，但對其有效性的信任正在流失。溝通環(huán)境更加嘈雜，信息本身也充滿爭議。各國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人不得不在持續(xù)的國內(nèi)壓力之下，以更快的節(jié)奏、在更低確定性的條件下作出決策。

Crisis-management mechanisms still exist, but trust in them has eroded. Communication is noisier. Information is contested. Leaders must act faster, with less certainty, under constant domestic pressure.

當(dāng)下真正的危險(xiǎn)，并非蓄意發(fā)動戰(zhàn)爭，而是在高壓環(huán)境下發(fā)生的誤判與失算。這并不是在為一場特定的戰(zhàn)爭做準(zhǔn)備，而是在為一個(gè)充滿危險(xiǎn)的長期時(shí)代作準(zhǔn)備。

The danger today is not deliberate war, it is miscalculation under stress.This is not preparation for a single war. It is preparation for a long era of danger.

在2025年，安全已不再僅僅意味著坦克、部隊(duì)或航空母艦；它所涵蓋的內(nèi)容還包括：

Security in 2025 is no longer confined to tanks, troops, or aircraft carriers.It now includes:

網(wǎng)絡(luò)空間，在那里，一次攻擊就可能癱瘓醫(yī)院、港口，甚至干擾選舉進(jìn)程。

Cyber space, where attacks can paralyse hospitals, ports, or elections.

外層空間，在那里，衛(wèi)星支撐著通信、導(dǎo)航以及金融體系的運(yùn)行。

Space, where satellites underpin communications, navigation, and finance.

能源領(lǐng)域，其中的關(guān)鍵咽喉要道與價(jià)格沖擊足以動搖政治穩(wěn)定。

Energy, where chokepoints and price shocks can destabilise governments.

數(shù)據(jù)與半導(dǎo)體領(lǐng)域，在這里，掌控權(quán)意味著經(jīng)濟(jì)與軍事上的雙重優(yōu)勢。

Data and semiconductors, where control means economic and military advantage.

供應(yīng)鏈體系，一旦發(fā)生中斷，便可能使整個(gè)產(chǎn)業(yè)陷入癱瘓。

Supply chains, where disruption can cripple entire industries.

這些新的安全領(lǐng)域催生了一種國家安全外延化的邏輯，并正在重塑其所觸及的一切——其中也包括貿(mào)易。貿(mào)易不再被視為創(chuàng)造穩(wěn)定的工具，而是被當(dāng)作一種戰(zhàn)略武器來運(yùn)用。關(guān)稅、出口管制、制裁以及產(chǎn)業(yè)補(bǔ)貼已不再是應(yīng)急手段，而是日常化的權(quán)力工具。戰(zhàn)略性產(chǎn)業(yè)受到重點(diǎn)保護(hù)，技術(shù)流動被嚴(yán)格限制，而相互依賴性本身也被視為一種脆弱性。

These new categories give rise to logic of expanded national security and it is reshaping everything it touches including trade which is now treated as weapon instead of a tool for creating stability. Tariffs, export controls, sanctions, and industrial subsidies are no longer emergency tools, they are routine instruments of power. Strategic industries are protected. Technology flows are restricted. Dependencies are treated as vulnerabilities.

有必要澄清的是，盡管到2026年全球貿(mào)易體系仍將繼續(xù)存在，但它已經(jīng)發(fā)生碎片化。以效率為核心驅(qū)動的貿(mào)易時(shí)代正在讓位于以安全為導(dǎo)向的貿(mào)易邏輯。供應(yīng)鏈將受到更嚴(yán)格的審視，既有的相互依賴將被重新界定為脆弱性，經(jīng)濟(jì)工具也將被公開用于戰(zhàn)略施壓與博弈。全球貿(mào)易規(guī)模或許尚未崩塌，但人們對貿(mào)易的信任已經(jīng)動搖。全球化正在被重新設(shè)計(jì)，而相互依存不再自動帶來穩(wěn)定——在許多情況下，它反而制造焦慮。

It worth clarifying that while the global trading system will continue to exist in 2026, but it is fractured. The age of trade driven primarily by efficiency has given way to trade driven by security. Supply chains will be scrutinised, dependencies will be reclassified as vulnerabilities, and economic instruments will openly be used for strategic leverage. Global trade volumes may not have collapsed, but trust in trade has. Globalisation will be redesigned. Interdependence no longer guarantees stability. In many cases, it generates anxiety.

圍繞特朗普關(guān)稅是否合法及是否延續(xù)、美中貿(mào)易協(xié)議能否落地、歐美是否對華采取更多貿(mào)易限制，以及美加墨自貿(mào)協(xié)定走向的不確定性，將把全球貿(mào)易的不穩(wěn)定性延續(xù)到2026年。圖源：路透社

作為全球碎片化鏡像的氣候治理

Climate Governance as a Mirror of Global Fragmentation

氣候治理，或許最能清楚地映照出這一碎片化秩序。到2026年，科學(xué)不確定性已不再是主要障礙，真正的難題在于政治與制度能力——也就是，能否把共同的判斷轉(zhuǎn)化為協(xié)調(diào)一致的行動。

Climate governance offers perhaps the clearest illustration of this fractured order. By 2026, scientific uncertainty is no longer the obstacle. The central challenge will be political and institutional capacity: the ability to translate shared diagnosis into coordinated action.

一個(gè)很少登上頭條、卻在2025年深刻塑造全球氣候治理不作為的重要因素，是將單邊的領(lǐng)土介入，作為威懾與施壓工具的戰(zhàn)略性運(yùn)用。

An important issue which never made the headlines but still remained as one of the most consequential dynamics shaping global climate inaction in 2025 was the strategic use of unilateral territorial interventions as instruments of intimidation.

這些行動——無論是通過公開的軍事存在、事實(shí)上的吞并，還是對爭議空間的強(qiáng)制性控制——其影響早已超出主權(quán)本身。它們制造出一種高度不確定的安全環(huán)境，迫使各國重新排序國家優(yōu)先事項(xiàng)，而代價(jià)往往是長期環(huán)境承諾被擠到一旁。對許多國家而言，尤其是中等和中低收入國家，領(lǐng)土不穩(wěn)定釋放出的信號十分清晰：一個(gè)安全不再由集體機(jī)制加以保障的世界，正在回歸。

These actions whether through overt military presence, de facto annexation, or coercive control of contested spaces extend beyond questions of sovereignty. They generated a climate of uncertainty that reorders national priorities, often to the detriment of long-term environmental commitments. For many states, particularly middle- and small-income countries, territorial instability signaled a return to a world where security is no longer collectively guaranteed.

在這樣的環(huán)境下，本質(zhì)上依賴合作、面向未來、又高度耗費(fèi)資源的氣候減緩與適應(yīng)行動，正變得越來越容易在政治優(yōu)先級的重新排序中被邊緣化。面對戰(zhàn)略壓力的政府，無論過去還是現(xiàn)在，都更傾向于把財(cái)政能力轉(zhuǎn)向國防、能源安全和邊境管控，并將氣候行動視為次要議題，甚至變成可以討價(jià)還價(jià)的對象。

In such an environment, climate mitigation and adaptation—by definition cooperative, future-oriented, and resource-intensive, appear increasingly vulnerable to political reprioritisation. Governments facing strategic pressure were and are more likely to divert fiscal capacity toward defence, energy security, and border control, framing climate action as a secondary or even negotiable concern.

以信任、互惠和長期時(shí)間尺度為基礎(chǔ)的氣候協(xié)定，在這種規(guī)范性信心不斷被侵蝕的環(huán)境中，顯得尤為脆弱。如果支撐國際合作的秩序本身正在松動，各國又憑什么要為減排承擔(dān)眼前、切實(shí)可感的成本？

Climate agreements, which rely on trust, reciprocity, and long time horizons, are particularly exposed to this erosion of normative confidence. Why incur near-term costs for emissions reductions if the international order that underwrites cooperation appears increasingly fragile?

在多邊層面，這種侵蝕體現(xiàn)為一種“戰(zhàn)略性的最低限度主義”。各國在形式上仍然參與氣候談判，但立場愈發(fā)謹(jǐn)慎，更強(qiáng)調(diào)靈活性，而非雄心。承諾被不斷附加條件，時(shí)間表一再拉長，落實(shí)則持續(xù)后移。這或許不應(yīng)被簡單理解為對氣候問題的否認(rèn)，而更像是一種“氣候猶疑”——其背后的認(rèn)知是：地緣政治格局變化的速度，已經(jīng)快于氣候治理體系所能穩(wěn)定下來的速度。

At the multilateral level, this erosion manifested itself as strategic minimalism. States remained formally engaged in climate negotiations, yet adopted cautious positions that prioritise flexibility over ambition. Pledges became conditional, timelines extended, and implementation was deferred. Probably, this could be interpreted not as climate denial, but climate hesitation, rooted in the perception that the geopolitical ground is shifting faster than the climate regime can stabilise.

在這樣的背景下，COP30等進(jìn)程或許將同時(shí)象征著延續(xù)與張力：它們一方面重申了多邊參與的持續(xù)存在，另一方面也清晰暴露出多邊機(jī)制的邊界。承諾層出不窮，但落實(shí)依然參差不齊。適應(yīng)議題的地位顯著上升，這在某種程度上也隱含著一種共識——僅靠減緩行動，已不足以避免嚴(yán)重沖擊。（相關(guān)文章：）

In that light, processes such as COP30 could symbolise both continuity and strain. They reaffirm the persistence of multilateral engagement, yet simultaneously reveal its limits. Commitments proliferate, but implementation remains uneven. Adaptation has risen to prominence, signaling an implicit acknowledgment that mitigation alone will not avert severe disruption.（Read more in：）

COP30——聯(lián)合國氣候變化框架公約締約方大會第三十屆會議，巴西貝倫。圖源：歐洲議會

真正的危險(xiǎn)并不只是失敗本身，而是對“不充分”的常態(tài)化接受：這一轉(zhuǎn)變標(biāo)志著一次關(guān)鍵的心理與政治轉(zhuǎn)折。氣候治理不再僅僅圍繞防止災(zāi)難發(fā)生來展開，而是逐漸轉(zhuǎn)向如何管理災(zāi)難后果。責(zé)任在原則層面得到承認(rèn)，卻在實(shí)踐中被不斷分散。全球氣候版圖，如同地緣政治版圖一樣，更多呈現(xiàn)的是妥協(xié)，而非協(xié)調(diào)與一致。

This shift marks a critical psychological and political transition. Climate governance is no longer framed solely around preventing catastrophe, but around managing its consequences. Responsibility is recognised in principle, yet dispersed in practice. The global climate map, like the geopolitical one, reflects compromise more than coherence.

這是一個(gè)漸進(jìn)式進(jìn)展與風(fēng)險(xiǎn)持續(xù)上升并存的世界——一個(gè)雄心被不斷下調(diào)、更多去適應(yīng)政治上的可行性，而非地球真正所需尺度的世界。

The danger is not failure alone, but normalisation of inadequacy: a world in which incremental progress coexists with escalating risk, and ambition is continuously recalibrated downward to match political feasibility rather than planetary necessity.

很多國際機(jī)構(gòu)原本是為促進(jìn)合作而設(shè)立的，但到了2025年，善意正變得越來越稀缺。規(guī)則被選擇性適用，一旦不合時(shí)宜，多邊平臺就被繞開。多邊主義依然存在，卻越來越像一個(gè)按需取用的工具箱，而不再是一項(xiàng)需要共同維護(hù)的事業(yè)。這并不是一場轟然倒塌的制度危機(jī)，而是一種更隱蔽、也更危險(xiǎn)的狀態(tài)——制度性的疲憊。

International institutions were designed for cooperation in good faith. In 2025, good faith is in short supply.Rules are applied selectively. Forums are bypassed when inconvenient. Multilateralism survives, but increasingly as a toolbox rather than a shared project.This is not institutional failure in a dramatic sense. It is something quieter and more dangerous: institutional exhaustion.

2025年留下的遺產(chǎn)：一個(gè)在危機(jī)中被治理的世界

The legacy: a world governed through crisis

2025年留下的遺產(chǎn)，是一種持久的心態(tài)轉(zhuǎn)變：穩(wěn)定不再被視為理所當(dāng)然，而是成為一種需要被管理、分配，甚至反復(fù)談判的狀態(tài)。

The legacy of 2025 will not be one dramatic memory, but a lasting mindset. A year that stability was no longer assumed but, it was managed, rationed, and negotiated daily.

那么，為什么2025年比此前的年份更為重要？因?yàn)檎窃谶@一年，一種微妙卻決定性的轉(zhuǎn)變發(fā)生了：各國不再把當(dāng)下視為一段暫時(shí)的動蕩期，而是開始以動蕩將長期存在為前提來進(jìn)行治理。

So why does 2025 matter more than the years before it? Because by this year, a subtle but decisive shift occurs. States stop behaving as though they are navigating temporary turbulence, and begin governing as though turbulence is permanent.

防務(wù)姿態(tài)趨于強(qiáng)硬，貿(mào)易限制被常態(tài)化；同盟關(guān)系更多采取對沖而非信任；危機(jī)工具逐漸成為默認(rèn)手段，應(yīng)急措施演變?yōu)殚L期策略，例外政策不再例外，危機(jī)語言也悄然融入了日常政治表達(dá)之中。

Defence postures harden. Trade restrictions become normalised. Alliances hedged rather than trusted. Crisis tools turn into default instruments and emergency measures became long-term strategies, exceptional policies became normal and, crisis language became everyday language.

如果歷史學(xué)家日后回望這一年，或許會這樣評價(jià)：2025年并不是世界崩塌的一年，而是世界開始接受自身已難以被輕易修復(fù)的一年。這正是所謂“轉(zhuǎn)軸之年”的含義所在——它并非不穩(wěn)定的起點(diǎn)，而是不穩(wěn)定被真正嵌入、并逐步制度化的時(shí)刻。

If historians look back, they may say:2025 was the year the world did not break, but the year it accepted that it would not easily be repaired. This is the essence of a hinge year. Not the start of instability, but the moment when instability becomes embedded.

作為“門檻之年”的2025年

2025 as a Threshold Year

2025年的獨(dú)特之處，并不在于它化解了這些緊張關(guān)系，而在于它讓這些緊張關(guān)系變得無法回避。關(guān)于世界能夠回到穩(wěn)定、統(tǒng)一秩序的幻象正在消散。取而代之的，并非必然是悲觀情緒，而是一種責(zé)任——一種直面復(fù)雜性、對其加以治理而非否認(rèn)其存在的責(zé)任。

What makes 2025 distinctive is not that it resolves these tensions, but that it renders them unavoidable. The illusion of a return to stable, unified global maps has faded. What replaces it is not necessarily pessimism, but responsibility: the responsibility to govern complexity rather than deny it.

人們對世界能夠回到由一套單一規(guī)則所支配的穩(wěn)定、統(tǒng)一秩序的信念，正在逐漸消退。取而代之的，是一項(xiàng)更為艱巨、也更具挑戰(zhàn)性的任務(wù)：如何在避免碎片化的同時(shí)治理多元，在不走向解體的前提下容納差異。

The belief that the world can return to a stable, unified order governed by a single set of rules has faded. In its place emerges a more demanding task: governing plurality without fragmentation, diversity without disintegration.

從2025年逐漸浮現(xiàn)的未來，很可能是多元的、不均衡的，也充滿競爭與博弈的。進(jìn)步將以局部、零散的方式出現(xiàn)，而在其他領(lǐng)域則可能遭遇挫折。治理形態(tài)也將呈現(xiàn)出混合特征——正式制度與非正式網(wǎng)絡(luò)并存，城市與國家相互交織，公共權(quán)威與公民創(chuàng)新共同發(fā)揮作用。

The future emerging from 2025 is likely to be plural, uneven, and contested. Progress will occur in pockets, setbacks elsewhere. Governance will be hybrid, combining formal institutions with informal networks, cities with states, public authority with civic innovation.

在這樣的格局中，真正的任務(wù)已不再是重新繪制一張單一的全球版圖，而是學(xué)會在多張彼此重疊、相互交錯的版圖中前行：在碎片化的空間之間搭建橋梁，把短期的適應(yīng)性應(yīng)對與長期的結(jié)構(gòu)性轉(zhuǎn)型協(xié)調(diào)起來，以治理成效而非修辭話語重塑合法性，并重新將權(quán)力與責(zé)任連接起來。

In this landscape, the task is not to redraw a single global map, but to learn how to navigate multiple, overlapping ones, to build bridges between fragmented spaces, align short-term adaptation with long-term transformation, and recover legitimacy through effectiveness rather than rhetoric, and reconnecting power with responsibility.

“碎裂的版圖”并不僅僅是一種隱喻，它在現(xiàn)實(shí)中具有明確的物理呈現(xiàn)，體現(xiàn)為風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分布的高度不均。氣候暴露、經(jīng)濟(jì)脆弱性與政治不穩(wěn)定性在空間上日益疊加、相互交織，不斷強(qiáng)化脆弱性循環(huán)。

Fractured maps are not only metaphorical. They manifest physically in the uneven distribution of risk. Climate exposure, economic vulnerability, and political instability increasingly overlap spatially, reinforcing cycles of fragility.

這種空間層面的復(fù)雜性，對仍然以國家為中心、以領(lǐng)土為基本單位的治理框架構(gòu)成了嚴(yán)峻挑戰(zhàn)。為有限、封閉的國家空間而設(shè)計(jì)的政策，往往難以應(yīng)對那些具有系統(tǒng)性、流動性和跨國屬性的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。結(jié)果便是治理上的失配：在技術(shù)層面高度精密的干預(yù)措施，卻難以真正觸及社會現(xiàn)實(shí)。

This spatial complexity challenges governance frameworks that remain largely state-centric and territorial. Policies designed for bounded national spaces struggle to address risks that are systemic, mobile, and transboundary. The result is frequent misalignment: technically sophisticated interventions that fail to engage social realities.

因此，理解2025年，需要一種多尺度的視角，能夠同時(shí)把握全球體系、國家層面的政策，以及地方層面的現(xiàn)實(shí)經(jīng)驗(yàn)。否則，“碎裂的版圖”就不再只是對現(xiàn)實(shí)的描述，反而會變成一種預(yù)設(shè)——不斷固化分裂，而非加以化解。

Understanding 2025 thus requires a multi-scale lens, capable of reading global systems, national policies, and local experiences simultaneously. Without such an approach, fractured maps become not only descriptive, but prescriptive, reinforcing fragmentation rather than addressing it.

美國總統(tǒng)決定不邀南非參加下一屆G20峰會。全球協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制在2026年可能繼續(xù)面臨裂痕。圖源：路透社

結(jié)論：學(xué)會治理一個(gè)“版圖碎裂”的世界

Conclusion: Learning to Govern a World of Fractured Maps

由此也引出了一個(gè)最終的問題：2025年所留下的影響，是否將具有長期性？

And that leaves us with a final question. Is the legacy of 2025, likely to be long-lasting?

在“版圖碎裂”的一年里所顯現(xiàn)的未來，并不是對全球治理的訃告，而更像是一份關(guān)于轉(zhuǎn)型的診斷書。世界并非不可治理，而是正在以不同于以往的方式被治理。真正的難題在于，如何調(diào)整制度安排、認(rèn)知框架與政治激勵機(jī)制，使它們能夠與當(dāng)下現(xiàn)實(shí)的復(fù)雜性相匹配。

The future in a year of fractured maps, is not an obituary for global governance, but a diagnosis of transition. The world is not ungovernable; it is differently governable. The difficulty lies in adjusting institutions, mental models, and political incentives to match the complexity of contemporary reality.

這需要一次范式轉(zhuǎn)變——學(xué)會接受那些曾經(jīng)被視為非常態(tài)的情形，正在變成日常：要適應(yīng)缺乏清晰護(hù)欄的競爭格局，適應(yīng)快于外交運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)節(jié)奏的政治進(jìn)程，適應(yīng)由恐懼與機(jī)遇共同塑造的經(jīng)濟(jì)邏輯，適應(yīng)依然存在卻已難以形成廣泛共識的制度體系；也要適應(yīng)在危機(jī)條件下作出的決策，即便原初理由早已消退，仍會長期存續(xù)；適應(yīng)例外不斷累積，直至反過來重塑規(guī)則本身。最終，還要適應(yīng)一種預(yù)期的下移——從對秩序的樂觀想象，轉(zhuǎn)向在無序之中尋求可持續(xù)的生存。

This needs a paradigm shift to accept that what was once extraordinary to become routine. Adjusted to rivalry without clear guardrails, adjusted to politics that travel faster than diplomacy, adjusted to economics shaped by fear as much as opportunity, adjusted to institutions that persist, but no longer command consensus, adjust to decisions made under crisis conditions that tend to endure, even after the original justification fades, adjust to exceptions to multiply until they redefine the rule, adjust to downward expectations from optimism about order to endurance within disorder.

國際體系正是以這樣的方式發(fā)生變化的——并非一夜之間，而是通過一次次悄然的再校準(zhǔn)。從這個(gè)意義上看，2025年或許將被銘記為這樣一年：危機(jī)不再是例外，而是成為一種常態(tài)化的存在。

This is how international systems change-not overnight- but through quiet recalibration. In that sense, 2025 may be remembered as the year crisis ceased to be an exception, and became a condition.

如果說以往的時(shí)代追求的是通過一致性實(shí)現(xiàn)統(tǒng)一，那么2025年之后的世界，則需要在多樣性中建立協(xié)調(diào)與連貫。城市、氣候治理以及不斷演化的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)形態(tài)，未必會整齊地匯聚到同一軌道上，但它們可以被引導(dǎo)形成共振。未來的關(guān)鍵，與其說在于修復(fù)舊有的世界版圖，不如說在于培育一種能力——以審慎、合乎倫理且集體性的方式，去理解和辨讀新的世界圖景。

If earlier eras sought unity through uniformity, the post-2025 world will require coherence through diversity. Cities, climate governance, and evolving forms of leadership will not converge neatly, but they can be made to resonate. The future depends less on restoring old maps than on cultivating the capacity to read new ones carefully, ethically, and collectively.

2025年很可能會被記住為一個(gè)多重危機(jī)疊加的年份；更重要的是，它并非危機(jī)降臨之年，而是世界接受危機(jī)將長期存在的那一年——正是在這一年中作出的選擇、面臨的約束與持續(xù)的再校準(zhǔn)，深刻塑造了此后多年的國際體系走向。而接下來將走向何方，則取決于適應(yīng)究竟能轉(zhuǎn)化為更新與重塑，還是滑向消極的接受與退卻。

2025 could very well be remembered as a year of compounded crisis, and more importantly not the year crisis arrived but the year the world accepted that crisis was here to stay: A year whose choices, constraints, and recalibrations shaped the international system for years afterward. And what comes next depends on whether adaptation turns into renewal or resignation.

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