鮑威爾講話：縮表即將告終

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Thank you, Emily. And thank you to the National Association for Business Economics for the Adam Smith Award. It is an honor just to be mentioned alongside past recipients, including my predecessors Janet Yellen and Ben Bernanke. Thank you for this recognition and for the opportunity to speak with you today.

謝謝你，艾米麗。也感謝全美商業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)協(xié)會(huì)（National Association for Business Economics）授予我亞當(dāng)·斯密獎(jiǎng)。能與包括我的前任珍妮特·耶倫（Janet Yellen）和本·伯南克（Ben Bernanke）在內(nèi)的歷屆獲獎(jiǎng)?wù)呦嗵岵⒄摚疑罡袠s幸。感謝你們的認(rèn)可，也感謝今天有機(jī)會(huì)與大家交談。

Monetary policy is more effective when the public understands what the Federal Reserve does and why. With that in mind, I hope to enhance understanding of one of the more arcane and technical aspects of monetary policy: the Federal Reserve's balance sheet. A colleague recently compared this topic to a trip to the dentist, but that comparison may be unfair—to dentists.

當(dāng)公眾理解美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)的行動(dòng)及其原因時(shí)，貨幣政策會(huì)更加有效。本著這一想法，我希望增進(jìn)大家對(duì)貨幣政策中一個(gè)更為晦澀和技術(shù)性方面——美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表——的理解。一位同事最近將這個(gè)話題比作去看牙醫(yī)，但這種比較可能對(duì)牙醫(yī)不公平。

Today, I will discuss the essential role our balance sheet played during the pandemic, along with some lessons learned. I will then review our ample reserves implementation framework and the progress we have made toward normalizing the size of our balance sheet. I will conclude with some brief remarks on the economic outlook.

今天，我將討論我們的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表在疫情期間所扮演的關(guān)鍵角色，以及我們學(xué)到的一些經(jīng)驗(yàn)教訓(xùn)。然后，我將回顧我們的充足準(zhǔn)備金實(shí)施框架以及我們?cè)谫Y產(chǎn)負(fù)債表規(guī)模正常化方面取得的進(jìn)展。最后，我將對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)前景做簡(jiǎn)要評(píng)論。

Background on the Fed's Balance Sheet
One of the primary purposes of a central bank is to provide the monetary foundation for the financial system and the broader economy. This foundation is made of central bank liabilities. On the Fed's balance sheet, the liability side of the ledger totaled $6.5 trillion as of October 8, and three categories account for roughly 95 percent of that total.2 First, Federal Reserve notes—that is, physical currency—totaled $2.4 trillion. Second, reserves—funds held by depository institutions at the Federal Reserve Banks—totaled $3.0 trillion. These deposits allow commercial banks to make and receive payments and meet regulatory requirements. Reserves are the safest and most liquid asset in the financial system, and only the Fed can create them. The adequate provision of reserves is essential to the safety and soundness of our banking system, the resilience and efficiency of our payments system, and ultimately the stability of our economy.

美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表背景

央行的主要目的之一是為金融體系和更廣泛的經(jīng)濟(jì)體提供貨幣基礎(chǔ)。這個(gè)基礎(chǔ)由央行負(fù)債構(gòu)成。在美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表上，截至10月8日，負(fù)債方總額為6.5萬(wàn)億美元，其中三類負(fù)債約占總額的95%。2 首先，聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)備券——即流通中的現(xiàn)鈔——總額為2.4萬(wàn)億美元。其次，準(zhǔn)備金——存款機(jī)構(gòu)存放在聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)備銀行的資金——總額為3.0萬(wàn)億美元。這些存款使商業(yè)銀行能夠進(jìn)行收付款并滿足監(jiān)管要求。準(zhǔn)備金是金融體系中最安全、流動(dòng)性最強(qiáng)的資產(chǎn)，并且只有美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)能夠創(chuàng)造它們。充足的準(zhǔn)備金供應(yīng)對(duì)于我們銀行體系的安全與穩(wěn)健、支付體系的彈性和效率，以及最終我們經(jīng)濟(jì)的穩(wěn)定至關(guān)重要。

Third is the Treasury General Account (TGA), currently at about $800 billion, which essentially is the checking account for the federal government. When the Treasury makes or receives payments, those flows affect dollar-for-dollar the supply of reserves or other liabilities in the system.3

第三是財(cái)政部一般存款賬戶（TGA），目前約有8000億美元，這基本上是聯(lián)邦政府的支票賬戶。當(dāng)財(cái)政部進(jìn)行支付或接收款項(xiàng)時(shí)，這些資金流動(dòng)會(huì)等額影響系統(tǒng)中準(zhǔn)備金或其他負(fù)債的供給。3

The asset side of our ledger consists almost entirely of securities, including $4.2 trillion of U.S. Treasury securities and $2.1 trillion of government-guaranteed agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS).4 When we add reserves to the system, we generally do so by purchasing Treasury securities in the open market and crediting the reserve accounts of the banks involved in the transaction with the seller. This process effectively transforms securities held by the public into reserves but does not change the total amount of government liabilities held by the public.5

我們資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表的資產(chǎn)方幾乎完全由證券構(gòu)成，包括4.2萬(wàn)億美元的美國(guó)國(guó)債和2.1萬(wàn)億美元的政府擔(dān)保機(jī)構(gòu)抵押貸款支持證券（MBS）。? 當(dāng)我們向系統(tǒng)增加準(zhǔn)備金時(shí)，通常是通過(guò)在公開(kāi)市場(chǎng)上購(gòu)買國(guó)債，并將相應(yīng)金額計(jì)入與賣方交易的銀行的準(zhǔn)備金賬戶。這個(gè)過(guò)程有效地將公眾持有的證券轉(zhuǎn)化為準(zhǔn)備金，但不會(huì)改變公眾持有的政府負(fù)債總額。?

The Balance Sheet Is an Important Tool
The Fed's balance sheet serves as a critical policy tool, especially when the policy rate is constrained by the effective lower bound (ELB). When COVID-19 struck in March 2020, the economy came to a near standstill and financial markets seized up, threatening to transform a public health crisis into a severe, prolonged economic downturn.

資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表是一個(gè)重要工具
美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表是一個(gè)關(guān)鍵的政策工具，尤其是在政策利率受到有效利率下限（ELB）約束時(shí)。當(dāng)2020年3月新冠疫情來(lái)襲時(shí)，經(jīng)濟(jì)幾乎陷入停滯，金融市場(chǎng)失靈，有可能將一場(chǎng)公共衛(wèi)生危機(jī)轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)橐粓?chǎng)嚴(yán)重而持久的經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退。

In response, we established a number of emergency liquidity facilities. Those programs, supported by Congress and the Administration, provided critical support to markets and were remarkably effective in restoring confidence and stability. At their peak in July 2020, loans from these facilities totaled just over $200 billion. Most of these loans were quickly unwound as conditions stabilized.6

作為回應(yīng)，我們?cè)O(shè)立了多項(xiàng)緊急流動(dòng)性工具。這些在國(guó)會(huì)和政府支持下的計(jì)劃，為市場(chǎng)提供了關(guān)鍵支持，并在恢復(fù)信心和穩(wěn)定方面取得了顯著成效。在2020年7月的高峰期，這些工具提供的貸款總額略超2000億美元。隨著市場(chǎng)狀況穩(wěn)定，大部分貸款很快被解除。?

At the same time, the market for U.S. Treasury securities—normally the deepest, most liquid market in the world and the bedrock of the global financial system—was under extraordinary pressure and on the verge of collapse. We used large-scale purchases of securities to restore functionality to the Treasury market. Faced with unprecedented market dysfunction, the Fed purchased Treasury and agency securities at an extraordinary pace in March and April of 2020. These purchases supported the flow of credit to households and businesses and fostered more accommodative financial conditions to support the recovery of the economy when it ultimately came.7 This source of policy accommodation was important as we had lowered the federal funds rate close to zero and expected it to remain there for some time.

與此同時(shí)，通常是世界上最深、流動(dòng)性最強(qiáng)的市場(chǎng)，也是全球金融體系基石的美國(guó)國(guó)債市場(chǎng)，正承受著巨大的壓力，瀕臨崩潰。我們通過(guò)大規(guī)模購(gòu)買證券來(lái)恢復(fù)國(guó)債市場(chǎng)的功能。面對(duì)前所未有的市場(chǎng)失靈，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)在2020年3月和4月以前所未有的速度購(gòu)買了國(guó)債和機(jī)構(gòu)證券。這些購(gòu)買支持了對(duì)家庭和企業(yè)的信貸流動(dòng)，并營(yíng)造了更為寬松的金融環(huán)境，以支持經(jīng)濟(jì)最終到來(lái)的復(fù)蘇。? 這種政策寬松的來(lái)源非常重要，因?yàn)槲覀円褜⒙?lián)邦基金利率降至接近零的水平，并預(yù)計(jì)將在一段時(shí)間內(nèi)保持在該水平。

By June 2020, we slowed our purchase pace to a still substantial $120 billion per month. In December 2020, as the economic outlook remained highly uncertain, the FOMC said that we expected to maintain that pace of purchases "until substantial further progress has been made toward the Committee's maximum employment and price stability goals."8 That guidance provided assurance that the Fed would not prematurely withdraw support while the economic recovery remained fragile amid unprecedented conditions.

到2020年6月，我們將購(gòu)買速度放緩至每月1200億美元，這仍然是一個(gè)相當(dāng)大的數(shù)額。2020年12月，由于經(jīng)濟(jì)前景仍然高度不確定，聯(lián)邦公開(kāi)市場(chǎng)委員會(huì)（FOMC）表示，我們預(yù)計(jì)將維持這一購(gòu)買速度，“直到在實(shí)現(xiàn)委員會(huì)的最大就業(yè)和價(jià)格穩(wěn)定目標(biāo)方面取得實(shí)質(zhì)性進(jìn)一步進(jìn)展”。? 這一指引提供了保證，即在經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇于前所未有的條件下仍然脆弱時(shí)，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)不會(huì)過(guò)早撤回支持。

We maintained that pace of asset purchases through October 2021. By then, it had become apparent that elevated inflation was not likely to go away without a strong monetary response. At our meeting in November 2021, we announced a phaseout of asset purchases. At our next meeting in December, we doubled the pace of the taper and said that asset purchases would conclude by mid-March of 2022. Over the entire period of purchases, our securities holdings increased by $4.6 trillion.

我們一直將這一資產(chǎn)購(gòu)買速度維持到2021年10月。到那時(shí)，情況已經(jīng)很明顯，若無(wú)強(qiáng)有力的貨幣政策回應(yīng)，高企的通脹不太可能自行消退。在我們2021年11月的會(huì)議上，我們宣布逐步退出資產(chǎn)購(gòu)買。在接下來(lái)的12月會(huì)議上，我們將縮減購(gòu)債的步伐加倍，并表示資產(chǎn)購(gòu)買將在2022年3月中旬結(jié)束。在整個(gè)購(gòu)買期間，我們持有的證券增加了4.6萬(wàn)億美元。

A number of observers have raised questions, fairly enough, about the size and composition of asset purchases during the pandemic recovery.9 Throughout 2020 and 2021, the economy continued to face significant challenges as successive waves of COVID caused widespread disruption and loss. During that tumultuous period, we continued purchases in order to avoid a sharp, unwelcome tightening of financial conditions at a time when the economy still appeared to be highly vulnerable. Our thinking was informed by recent episodes in which signals about reducing the balance sheet had triggered significant tightening in financial conditions. We were thinking of events of December 2018, as well as the 2013 "taper tantrum."10

一些觀察人士對(duì)疫情恢復(fù)期間資產(chǎn)購(gòu)買的規(guī)模和構(gòu)成提出了相當(dāng)合理的疑問(wèn)。? 在整個(gè)2020年和2021年，隨著一波又一波的新冠疫情造成廣泛的破壞和損失，經(jīng)濟(jì)持續(xù)面臨重大挑戰(zhàn)。在那個(gè)動(dòng)蕩時(shí)期，我們繼續(xù)進(jìn)行購(gòu)買，以避免在經(jīng)濟(jì)似乎仍然非常脆弱的時(shí)候出現(xiàn)急劇且不受歡迎的金融條件收緊。我們的想法受到了近期一些事件的啟發(fā)，在這些事件中，有關(guān)縮減資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表的信號(hào)曾引發(fā)了金融條件的顯著收緊。我們想到的是2018年12月的事件，以及2013年的“縮減恐慌”。1?

Regarding the composition of our purchases, some have questioned the inclusion of agency MBS purchases given the strong housing market during the pandemic recovery.11 Outside of purchases aimed specifically at market functioning, MBS purchases are primarily intended, like our purchases of Treasury securities, to ease broader financial conditions when the policy rate is constrained at the ELB.12 The extent to which these MBS purchases disproportionately affected housing market conditions during this period is challenging to determine. Many factors affect the mortgage market, and many factors beyond the mortgage market affect supply and demand in the broader housing market.13

關(guān)于我們購(gòu)買的構(gòu)成，一些人質(zhì)疑在疫情恢復(fù)期間房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)強(qiáng)勁的情況下，為何要購(gòu)買機(jī)構(gòu)MBS。11 除了專門針對(duì)市場(chǎng)功能的購(gòu)買外，MBS購(gòu)買的主要目的，與我們購(gòu)買國(guó)債一樣，是在政策利率受有效利率下限（ELB）約束時(shí)，放寬更廣泛的金融條件。12 在此期間，這些MBS購(gòu)買在多大程度上對(duì)房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)狀況產(chǎn)生了不成比例的影響，是難以確定的。許多因素影響抵押貸款市場(chǎng)，而抵押貸款市場(chǎng)之外的許多因素也影響著更廣泛的房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)的供需。13

With the clarity of hindsight, we could have—and perhaps should have—stopped asset purchases sooner. Our real-time decisions were intended to serve as insurance against downside risks. We knew that we could unwind purchases relatively quickly once we ended them, which is exactly what we did. Research and experience tell us that asset purchases affect the economy through expectations regarding the future size and duration of our balance sheet.14 When we announced our taper, market participants began pricing in its effects, pulling forward the tightening in financial conditions.15 Stopping sooner could have made some difference, but not likely enough to fundamentally alter the trajectory of the economy. Nonetheless, our experience since 2020 does suggest that we can be more nimble in our use of the balance sheet, and more confident that our communications will foster appropriate expectations among market participants given their growing experience with these tools.

事后看來(lái)，我們本可以——或許也應(yīng)該——更早停止資產(chǎn)購(gòu)買。我們當(dāng)時(shí)的實(shí)時(shí)決策旨在作為防范下行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的保險(xiǎn)。我們知道，一旦停止購(gòu)買，我們可以相對(duì)迅速地解除它們，而這也正是我們所做的。研究和經(jīng)驗(yàn)告訴我們，資產(chǎn)購(gòu)買通過(guò)對(duì)我們資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表未來(lái)規(guī)模和持續(xù)時(shí)間的預(yù)期來(lái)影響經(jīng)濟(jì)。1? 當(dāng)我們宣布縮減購(gòu)債時(shí)，市場(chǎng)參與者開(kāi)始計(jì)入其影響，從而提前了金融條件的收緊。1? 更早停止購(gòu)買可能會(huì)產(chǎn)生一些影響，但可能不足以從根本上改變經(jīng)濟(jì)的軌跡。盡管如此，我們自2020年以來(lái)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)確實(shí)表明，我們可以更靈活地使用資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表，并且更有信心，鑒于市場(chǎng)參與者對(duì)這些工具的經(jīng)驗(yàn)日益豐富，我們的溝通將能培養(yǎng)他們形成適當(dāng)?shù)念A(yù)期。

Some have also argued that we could have better explained the purpose of asset purchases in real time.16 There is always room for improved communication. But I believe our statements were reasonably clear about our objectives, which were to support and then sustain smooth market functioning and to help foster accommodative financial conditions. Over time, the relative importance of those objectives evolved with economic conditions. But the objectives were never in conflict, so at the time this issue appeared to be a distinction without much of a difference. That is not always the case, of course. For example, the March 2023 banking stress led to a sizable increase in our balance sheet through lending operations. We clearly differentiated these financial stability operations from our monetary policy stance. Indeed, we continued to raise the policy rate through that time.

一些人還認(rèn)為，我們本可以在當(dāng)時(shí)更好地解釋資產(chǎn)購(gòu)買的目的。1? 溝通總有改進(jìn)的空間。但我相信，我們的聲明對(duì)于我們的目標(biāo)是相當(dāng)清晰的，即支持并維持市場(chǎng)的平穩(wěn)運(yùn)行，以及幫助營(yíng)造寬松的金融環(huán)境。隨著時(shí)間的推移，這些目標(biāo)的相對(duì)重要性隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況而演變。但這些目標(biāo)從未沖突，所以在當(dāng)時(shí)，這個(gè)問(wèn)題似乎只是一個(gè)沒(méi)有太大區(qū)別的細(xì)微差別。當(dāng)然，情況并非總是如此。例如，2023年3月的銀行業(yè)壓力導(dǎo)致我們的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表通過(guò)貸款操作大幅增加。我們明確區(qū)分了這些旨在維護(hù)金融穩(wěn)定的操作與我們的貨幣政策立場(chǎng)。事實(shí)上，在那段時(shí)間里，我們繼續(xù)提高了政策利率。

Our Ample Reserves Framework Works Well
Turning to my second topic, our ample reserves regime has proven highly effective, delivering good control of our policy rate across a wide range of challenging economic conditions, while promoting financial stability and supporting a resilient payments system.17

我們的充足準(zhǔn)備金框架運(yùn)作良好
轉(zhuǎn)向我的第二個(gè)話題，我們的充足準(zhǔn)備金制度已被證明非常有效，在各種充滿挑戰(zhàn)的經(jīng)濟(jì)條件下，都實(shí)現(xiàn)了對(duì)我們政策利率的良好控制，同時(shí)促進(jìn)了金融穩(wěn)定并支持了一個(gè)有彈性的支付體系。1?

In this framework, an ample supply of reserves ensures adequate liquidity in the banking system, and control of our policy rate is achieved through the setting of our administered rates—interest on reserve balances and the overnight reverse repo rate. This approach allows us to maintain rate control independently of the size of our balance sheet. That is important given large, unpredictable swings in liquidity demand from the private sector and significant fluctuations in autonomous factors affecting reserve supply, such as the Treasury General Account.

在這個(gè)框架下，充足的準(zhǔn)備金供應(yīng)確保了銀行體系內(nèi)有足夠的流動(dòng)性，而對(duì)我們政策利率的控制是通過(guò)設(shè)定我們的管理利率——準(zhǔn)備金余額利息和隔夜逆回購(gòu)利率——來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)的。這種方法使我們能夠在控制利率的同時(shí)，不受資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表規(guī)模的影響?？紤]到私營(yíng)部門流動(dòng)性需求的巨大且不可預(yù)測(cè)的波動(dòng)，以及影響準(zhǔn)備金供應(yīng)的自主性因素（如財(cái)政部一般賬戶）的顯著波動(dòng)，這一點(diǎn)非常重要。

This framework has proven resilient whether the balance sheet is shrinking or growing. Since June 2022, we have reduced the size of our balance sheet by $2.2 trillion—from 35 percent to just under 22 percent of GDP—while maintaining effective interest rate control.18

無(wú)論資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表是收縮還是擴(kuò)張，這個(gè)框架都顯示出了韌性。自2022年6月以來(lái)，我們已將資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表規(guī)?？s減了2.2萬(wàn)億美元——從占GDP的35%降至不足22%——同時(shí)保持了有效的利率控制。1?

Our long-stated plan is to stop balance sheet runoff when reserves are somewhat above the level we judge consistent with ample reserve conditions.19 We may approach that point in coming months, and we are closely monitoring a wide range of indicators to inform this decision.20 Some signs have begun to emerge that liquidity conditions are gradually tightening, including a general firming of repo rates along with more noticeable but temporary pressures on selected dates. The Committee's plans lay out a deliberately cautious approach to avoid the kind of money market strains experienced in September 2019. Moreover, the tools of our implementation framework, including the standing repo facility and the discount window, will help contain funding pressures and keep the federal funds rate within our target range through this transition to lower reserve levels.

我們長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)的計(jì)劃是，當(dāng)準(zhǔn)備金水平略高于我們判斷與充足準(zhǔn)備金條件相符的水平時(shí)，停止縮減資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表。1? 我們可能在未來(lái)幾個(gè)月接近這一點(diǎn)，并且我們正在密切監(jiān)測(cè)一系列廣泛的指標(biāo)來(lái)為這一決策提供信息。2? 一些跡象已經(jīng)開(kāi)始出現(xiàn)，表明流動(dòng)性狀況正在逐步收緊，包括回購(gòu)利率的普遍走強(qiáng)，以及在特定日期出現(xiàn)的更明顯但暫時(shí)的壓力。委員會(huì)的計(jì)劃制定了一個(gè)審慎的方法，以避免出現(xiàn)2019年9月那樣的貨幣市場(chǎng)緊張狀況。此外，我們實(shí)施框架的工具，包括常備回購(gòu)便利和貼現(xiàn)窗口，將有助于遏制融資壓力，并在此向較低準(zhǔn)備金水平過(guò)渡的過(guò)程中，將聯(lián)邦基金利率保持在我們的目標(biāo)區(qū)間內(nèi)。

Normalizing the size of our balance sheet does not mean going back to the balance sheet we had before the pandemic. In the longer run, the size of our balance sheet is determined by the public's demand for our liabilities rather than our pandemic-related asset purchases. Non-reserve liabilities currently stand about $1.1 trillion higher than just prior to the pandemic, thus requiring that our securities holdings be equally higher. Demand for reserves has risen as well, in part reflecting the growth of the banking system and the overall economy.

資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表規(guī)模正?；⒉灰馕吨氐揭咔榍暗馁Y產(chǎn)負(fù)債表。從長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來(lái)看，我們資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表的規(guī)模是由公眾對(duì)我們負(fù)債的需求決定的，而不是由我們與疫情相關(guān)的資產(chǎn)購(gòu)買決定的。目前，非準(zhǔn)備金負(fù)債比疫情前高出約1.1萬(wàn)億美元，因此要求我們持有的證券也要相應(yīng)增加。對(duì)準(zhǔn)備金的需求也有所上升，部分反映了銀行體系和整體經(jīng)濟(jì)的增長(zhǎng)。

Regarding the composition of our securities portfolio, relative to the outstanding universe of Treasury securities, our portfolio is currently overweight longer-term securities and underweight shorter-term securities. The longer-run composition will be a topic of Committee discussion. Transition to our desired composition will occur gradually and predictably, giving market participants time to adjust and minimizing the risk of market disruption. Consistent with our longstanding guidance, we aim for a portfolio consisting primarily of Treasury securities over the longer run.21

關(guān)于我們證券投資組合的構(gòu)成，相對(duì)于已發(fā)行的國(guó)債總量，我們的投資組合目前超配長(zhǎng)期證券，低配短期證券。長(zhǎng)期的構(gòu)成將是委員會(huì)討論的一個(gè)議題。向我們期望的構(gòu)成過(guò)渡將是漸進(jìn)和可預(yù)測(cè)的，給予市場(chǎng)參與者調(diào)整的時(shí)間，并最大限度地降低市場(chǎng)擾動(dòng)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。根據(jù)我們長(zhǎng)期的指引，我們的目標(biāo)是在長(zhǎng)期內(nèi)持有一個(gè)主要由國(guó)債構(gòu)成的投資組合。21

Some have questioned whether the interest we pay on reserves is costly to taxpayers. In fact, that is not the case. The Fed earns interest income from the Treasury securities that back reserves. Most of the time, our interest earnings from Treasury holdings more than cover the interest paid on reserves, generating significant remittances to the Treasury. By law, we remit all profits to the Treasury after covering expenses. Since 2008, even after accounting for the recent period of negative net income, our total remittances to Treasury have totaled more than $900 billion. While our net interest income has temporarily been negative due to the rapid rise in policy rates to control inflation, this is highly unusual. Our net income will soon turn positive again, as it typically has been throughout our history. Of course, having negative net income has no bearing on our ability to conduct monetary policy or meet our financial obligations.22

一些人質(zhì)疑我們支付給準(zhǔn)備金的利息是否會(huì)給納稅人帶來(lái)成本。事實(shí)上，情況并非如此。美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)從支持準(zhǔn)備金的國(guó)債中獲得利息收入。在大多數(shù)時(shí)候，我們從國(guó)債持有中獲得的利息收入足以覆蓋支付給準(zhǔn)備金的利息，從而為財(cái)政部帶來(lái)可觀的上繳利潤(rùn)。根據(jù)法律，我們?cè)诳鄢_(kāi)支后將所有利潤(rùn)上繳給財(cái)政部。自2008年以來(lái)，即使考慮到近期凈收入為負(fù)的時(shí)期，我們向財(cái)政部上繳的總額也超過(guò)了9000億美元。雖然由于為控制通脹而迅速提高政策利率，我們的凈利息收入暫時(shí)為負(fù)，但這是非常不尋常的。我們的凈收入很快將再次轉(zhuǎn)正，正如我們歷史上通常的情況一樣。當(dāng)然，凈收入為負(fù)對(duì)我們執(zhí)行貨幣政策或履行財(cái)務(wù)義務(wù)的能力沒(méi)有影響。22

If our ability to pay interest on reserves and other liabilities were eliminated, the Fed would lose control over rates. The stance of monetary policy would no longer be appropriately calibrated to economic conditions and would push the economy away from our employment and price stability goals. To restore rate control, large sales of securities over a short period of time would be needed to shrink our balance sheet and the quantity of reserves in the system. The volume and speed of these sales could strain Treasury market functioning and compromise financial stability. Market participants would need to absorb the sales of Treasury securities and agency MBS, which would put upward pressure on the entire yield curve, raising borrowing costs for the Treasury and the private sector. Even after that volatile and disruptive process, the banking system would be less resilient and more vulnerable to liquidity shocks.

如果我們支付準(zhǔn)備金和其他負(fù)債利息的能力被取消，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)將失去對(duì)利率的控制。貨幣政策的立場(chǎng)將不再能根據(jù)經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況進(jìn)行適當(dāng)校準(zhǔn)，并將使經(jīng)濟(jì)偏離我們的就業(yè)和價(jià)格穩(wěn)定目標(biāo)。為了恢復(fù)利率控制，將需要在短時(shí)間內(nèi)大規(guī)模出售證券，以縮減我們的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表和系統(tǒng)中的準(zhǔn)備金數(shù)量。這些出售的數(shù)量和速度可能會(huì)給國(guó)債市場(chǎng)運(yùn)作帶來(lái)壓力，并損害金融穩(wěn)定。市場(chǎng)參與者將需要吸收出售的國(guó)債和機(jī)構(gòu)MBS，這將對(duì)整個(gè)收益率曲線施加上行壓力，提高財(cái)政部和私營(yíng)部門的借貸成本。即使在那個(gè)動(dòng)蕩和破壞性的過(guò)程之后，銀行體系的韌性也會(huì)減弱，更容易受到流動(dòng)性沖擊的影響。

The bottom line is that our ample reserves regime has proven remarkably effective for implementing monetary policy and supporting economic and financial stability.

總而言之，我們的充足準(zhǔn)備金制度在實(shí)施貨幣政策以及支持經(jīng)濟(jì)和金融穩(wěn)定方面，已被證明非常有效。

Current Economic Conditions and Monetary Policy Outlook
I will close with a brief discussion of the economy and the outlook for monetary policy. Although some important government data have been delayed due to the shutdown, we routinely review a wide variety of public- and private-sector data that have remained available. We also maintain a nationwide network of contacts through the Reserve Banks who provide valuable insights, which will be summarized in tomorrow's Beige Book.

當(dāng)前經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況與貨幣政策展望
最后，我將簡(jiǎn)要討論經(jīng)濟(jì)和貨幣政策的前景。盡管由于政府停擺，一些重要的政府?dāng)?shù)據(jù)被延遲發(fā)布，但我們例行審查了各種仍然可用的公共和私營(yíng)部門數(shù)據(jù)。我們還通過(guò)各儲(chǔ)備銀行維持著一個(gè)全國(guó)性的聯(lián)系網(wǎng)絡(luò)，他們提供了寶貴的見(jiàn)解，這些見(jiàn)解將在明天的褐皮書(shū)（Beige Book）中進(jìn)行總結(jié)。

Based on the data that we do have, it is fair to say that the outlook for employment and inflation does not appear to have changed much since our September meeting four weeks ago. Data available prior to the shutdown, however, show that growth in economic activity may be on a somewhat firmer trajectory than expected.

根據(jù)我們確實(shí)擁有的數(shù)據(jù)，可以公平地說(shuō)，自四周前我們九月份的會(huì)議以來(lái)，就業(yè)和通脹的前景似乎沒(méi)有太大變化。然而，在政府停擺前可獲得的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)的增長(zhǎng)軌跡可能比預(yù)期的要稍微強(qiáng)勁一些。

While the unemployment rate remained low through August, payroll gains have slowed sharply, likely in part due to a decline in labor force growth due to lower immigration and labor force participation. In this less dynamic and somewhat softer labor market, the downside risks to employment appear to have risen. While official employment data for September are delayed, available evidence suggests that both layoffs and hiring remain low, and that both households' perceptions of job availability and firms' perceptions of hiring difficulty continue their downward trajectories.23

盡管截至八月份失業(yè)率保持在低位，但新增就業(yè)人數(shù)已急劇放緩，部分原因可能是由于移民減少和勞動(dòng)力參與率下降導(dǎo)致勞動(dòng)力增長(zhǎng)放緩。在這個(gè)活力減弱、略顯疲軟的勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)中，就業(yè)的下行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)似乎有所增加。雖然九月份的官方就業(yè)數(shù)據(jù)被延遲發(fā)布，但現(xiàn)有證據(jù)表明，裁員和招聘活動(dòng)都保持在低水平，并且家庭對(duì)工作機(jī)會(huì)的看法和企業(yè)對(duì)招聘難度的看法都繼續(xù)呈下降趨勢(shì)。23

Meanwhile, 12-month core PCE inflation was 2.9 percent in August, up slightly from earlier this year, as rising core goods inflation has outpaced continued disinflation in housing services. Available data and surveys continue to show that goods price increases primarily reflect tariffs rather than broader inflationary pressures. Consistent with these effects, near-term inflation expectations have generally increased this year, while most longer-term expectation measures remain aligned with our 2 percent goal.

與此同時(shí)，八月份的12個(gè)月核心個(gè)人消費(fèi)支出（PCE）通脹率為2.9%，比今年早些時(shí)候略有上升，因?yàn)楹诵纳唐吠浀纳蠞q超過(guò)了住房服務(wù)業(yè)的持續(xù)通縮?，F(xiàn)有數(shù)據(jù)和調(diào)查繼續(xù)顯示，商品價(jià)格上漲主要反映了關(guān)稅的影響，而非更廣泛的通脹壓力。與這些影響相一致，近期的通脹預(yù)期今年普遍上升，而大多數(shù)長(zhǎng)期預(yù)期指標(biāo)仍與我們2%的目標(biāo)保持一致。

Rising downside risks to employment have shifted our assessment of the balance of risks. As a result, we judged it appropriate to take another step toward a more neutral policy stance at our September meeting. There is no risk-free path for policy as we navigate the tension between our employment and inflation goals. This challenge was evident in the dispersion of Committee participants' projections at the September meeting. I will stress again that these projections should be understood as representing a range of potential outcomes whose probabilities evolve as new information informs our meeting-by-meeting approach to policymaking. We will set policy based on the evolution of the economic outlook and the balance of risks, rather than following a predetermined path.

就業(yè)下行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的上升改變了我們對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)平衡的評(píng)估。因此，在我們九月份的會(huì)議上，我們認(rèn)為采取進(jìn)一步措施，向更中性的政策立場(chǎng)邁進(jìn)是適當(dāng)?shù)?。在我們努力平衡就業(yè)和通脹目標(biāo)之間的緊張關(guān)系時(shí)，不存在無(wú)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的政策路徑。這一挑戰(zhàn)在九月份會(huì)議上委員會(huì)參與者預(yù)測(cè)的分散性中顯而易見(jiàn)。我將再次強(qiáng)調(diào)，這些預(yù)測(cè)應(yīng)被理解為代表了一系列可能的結(jié)果，其概率會(huì)隨著新信息為我們逐次會(huì)議的決策方法提供依據(jù)而演變。我們將根據(jù)經(jīng)濟(jì)前景的演變和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的平衡來(lái)制定政策，而不是遵循預(yù)設(shè)的路徑。

Thank you again for this award and for inviting me to join you today. I look forward to our conversation.

再次感謝你們授予我這個(gè)獎(jiǎng)項(xiàng)，并邀請(qǐng)我今天參加活動(dòng)。我期待著我們的對(duì)話。